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-74. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Authority for Jurisdiction:
by Order

of this

Court on

This

appeal

was granted

March 1, 1988, pursuant to Rule 5 of

the Utah Supreme Court.
5. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues of law presented here are:
a.
effect at

Does the version of the Utah Dram Shop Act in

the time

provide "light"

of the accident apply to those who only

beer as

defined by

the Alcoholic Beverage

Control Act?
b.

Does the

time of the accident
breach a

Utah Dram Shop Act in effect at the

require that

the provider

of alcohol

duty of ordinary care in order to be found liable,

or does the statute create strict liability?
c.
contributed

If
to

the
the

American
cause

of

alcohol to Wesley Harju, does any
Plaintiff's part

reduce her

Legion
the

is

found

accident

to have

by providing

comparative negligence on

right to

recover from

Defen-

dant?
d.
contributed

If
to

the
the

American
cause

of

Legion
the

is

found

accident

alcohol to Wesley Harju, does any negligence on

to have

by providing
the part of

Wesley Harju reduce the amount of damages for which American
Legion may be held liable?
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-8e.
contributed

If
to

the
the

American
cause

of

Legion
the

is

found

accident

to have

by providing

alcohol to Wesley Harju, does any contributory negligence on
the part of the State of Utah Department
Clearfield City,

or the

Utah Power

of Transportation,

& Light Company reduce

the amount of damages for which American Legion

may be held

liable?
f.
contributed
alcohol to

If
to

the
the

American
cause

of

Legion
the

is

found

accident

to have

by providing

Wesley Harju, is the American Legion entitled to

contribution from

any other

entity which

may have contri-

buted to the accident through its own negligence?
6. STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The statutes,

rules or cases in support of Appellant's

position are as follows:
STATUTES:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code Ann. Section 16-6-13.1(8)(d)
Code Ann. Section 32-1-3 (1953 as amended)
Code Ann. Section 32-1-36.5(1)(1)
Code Ann. Section 32-7-14
Code Ann. Section 32-7-24(b) and (c)
Code Arm. Section 32-11-1 et seq. (the Utah Dram Shop
Act in effect as of January 30, 1985)
Code Ann. Section 32A-1-22 (1985)
Code Ann. Section 32A-14-1 et seq. (the Utah Dram Shop
Act enacted during 1985 session and amended in 1986)
Code Arm. Section 63-30-8 (1953, as amended)
Code Ann. Section 68-3-11
Code Ann. Section 78-27-38 (1953 as amended)
Code Ann. Section 78-27-39 (1953 as amended)
Code Ann. Section 73-27-40(3) (1953 as amended)

A copy of these statutes are attached as Appendix A.
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-97. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an interlocutory appeal of rulings made

by the

Second Judicial District Court of Davis County in a civil damages
("dram shop") case.
of the

Motion of

Legion")
and the

The rulings being appealed

American Legion

Post No.

to Dismiss or in the Alternative
granting of

include a denial

124 (hereafter "the
for Summary Judgment,

Third-Party Defendants'

Motion for Summary

Judgment.
Oral argument was held October 27, 1987, on Third-Party
Defendants' Motion; a written Order based on the bench ruling was
signed by the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District
presiding, on

January 6,

1988.

ruling entered June 24, 1986.

Court Judge

This order confirmed an earlier

The interlocutory appeal was filed

January 25, 1988.
Wesley Harju (hereafter "Harju") consumed approximately
six beers within a several hour
the Legion.

period on

January 30,

1985, at

Afterward, as he was driving from the parking lot of

the Legion, Harju's vehicle struck a pedestrian, Marjorie Allisen
(hereafter

"Allisen"),

the

intersection of State Route

Plaintiff
126

and

in
800

this

action, at the

North

in Clearfield.

Allisen was injured as a result of the accident.
this action against the Legion under
11-1 (1), the Utah Dram Shop Act.

Utah Code

Allisen brought
Ann. Section 32-

The Post filed the notices
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-10required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act for claims against
three

governmental

entities,

"Clearfield"), Davis

County and

Clearfield

Complaint

against

Mountain

States

those

& Light

along with Utah Power

Telephone

&

(hereafter

the State of Utah Department of

Transportation (hereafter "UDOT").
party

City

The Legion
entities

Company

(except Davis County)
(hereafter

Telegraph

Legion's Third-Party Complaint was

brought a Third-

"UP&L") and

for contribution.

based upon

a claim

The

that the

reason Harju ran into Allisen was because of negligent design and
maintenance

of

the

intersection

maintenance of

a utility

stipulated

dismissing

to

and

negligent

placement and

pole at said intersection.
Mountain

Bell

after

The Legion

UP&L

admitted

ownership and placement of the utility pole.
8. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT NO. I:
effect at the time
provided "light"
Utah Code Ann.,

The version of the Utah Dram Shop Act in

of the

accident did

not apply

to those who

beer as defined by the Utah Liquor Control Act,
Title

extensive definitions

32.

The

Liquor

Control

Act contains

of terms used in that title.

Included are

definitions of "liquor" and "light beer".
mutually exclusive.

These

definitions are

The Utah Dram shop Act in effect at the time

of the accident applies to "liquor" and not to "light beer".
Legion only

served Harju

(the driver)

"light beer".

The

Thus, the
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-11Legion was

not included

in the

coverage of

the Utah Dram Shop

Act, and this entire action should be dismissed.
POINT NO. II:

The legislative history of the Utah Dram

it evident

that the version of that act in effect as

Shop makes

of January 30, 1985 did not create dram shop liability for giving
selling or

otherwise providing

beer.

after the accident show that the
that the

Legislature itself

was certain

version of the Utah Dram Shop Act in effect in 1985 did

not cover "light beer'1.
the Utah

Legislative actions taken

In fact, in 1986 the Legislature amended

Dram Shop Act to include in its coverage some providers

of beer.
POINT NO. Ill:

If

the Legion

is found

liable under

the Utah Dram Shop Act, it is entitled to contribution from other
tortfeasors who contributed to the accident.
evidenced support

The Legislature has

for a variety of social policies which must be

balanced by the courts in any given situation.
that the
Shop

It cannot be said

Legislature evidenced, in its adoption of the Utah Dram

Act,

an

contribution.

intent

to

ignore

the

general

rules regarding

Without an explicit showing of such intent, there

is a presumption that

the

normal

rules

regarding contribution

apply.
POINT NO. IV:

The

Legion

is entitled to contribution

despite the fact that the Utah Legislature abolished contribution

ALLISSN v. AMERICAN LEGION POST
NO. 134, et al.
Appellant's Brief
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-12after the cause of action arose.

When

the rules

it did

regarding contribution

changes in joint and several
unfair to

deprive a

tortfeasors

the Legislature modified
so in conjunction with

liability.

It

would

be grossly

party of the right to contribution from co-

without

protecting

that

party

from

exposure

to

liability which exceeds its pro rata portion of fault.
POINT NO. V:
tortfeasors"

within

Negligence Act.
action.

The
the

There

Legion,

meaning

UDOT
of

and

the

UP&L are "joint
Utah

Comparative

can be joint tort-feasors in a dram shop

Nothing in the overall statutory scheme

precludes such.

Analogies to Workers1 Compensation are inappropriate.
POINT NO. VI:

The standard of care imposed by the Utah

Dram Shop Act owed by one who serves alcohol in
terms needs to be clarified.
the standard
would

be

of care

extremely

There has been some confusion as to

required by
helpful

violation of its

for

the Utah
this

Dram Shop

Court

Act.

It

to address those

questions if a trial in this matter will be necessary.
9. ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THE VERSION OF THE UTAH DRAM SHOP
ACT IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE
ACCIDENT DID NOT APPLY TO THOSE WHO
PROVIDED LIGHT BEER AS DEFINED BY
THE UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL ACT, UTAH
CODE ANN., TITLE 32.
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-13The definitions

of "light beer" and "liquor" under the

Utah Liquor Control Act (which is Title 32
which

the

Utah

Dram

shop

Act

of Utah

Code Ann. in

is located) preclude assessing

liability under its terms for one who only provides "light beer."
"Light beer"

was defined

by the Utah Legislature at the time of

the accident by Utah Code Ann. Section 32-1-3 as having
than

3.2

per

centum

of

"liquor" operable at that

alcohol by weight.
time,

as

defined

not more

The definition of
in

the

same code

section explicitly excludes "light beer."
Before Utah

Code Ann.

Section 32-11-1(1) was repealed

in 1985 it stated that:
Any person who gives, sells, or otherwise
provides
intoxicating
liquor to another
contrary
to
Subsection
16-6-13.1(8)(d),
subsection 32-1-36.5(1)(1), section 32-7-14
or subsection 32-7-24(b) or (c), and thereby
causes the intoxication of the other person,
is liable for injuries in person, property,
or means of support to any third person, or
the spouse child or parent of that third
person, resulting from the intoxication.
Since the

Utah Liquor

Control Act

specifically excludes "light

beer" from the definition of "liquor" the Dram Shop Act in effect
at the time of the accident did not include providers for beer.
It must

be concluded

that the

Legislature has chosen

its words carefully.

Words and

phrases are

they are

statute.

Utah Code

defined by

"The rule is well established

that

the

to be

construed as

Ann. Section 68-3-11.
General

Assembly!s own
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-14construction

of

its

language,

as

controls in the application of a

provided

statute.

by

definitions,

[citations omitted].

This definition will be given great weight against any claim that
application

of

purpose

the

of

the

Parklawn Manor,

statutory

statute."
Inc., 41

definition
Ohio

Ohio St.

defeats

Civil

Rights

2d 47,

the general
Commission y.

50; 322

N.E. 2d 642

(1975).
Moreover, the specific statutory provisions included in
the relevant version of the Dram Shop Act

also preclude applica-

tion to the Legion:
1.

Subsection

16-6-13.1(8)(d)

applies

only

establishments with state liquor stores on their premises.
subsection also

has

That

only applies to liquor and wine (items which can

only be sold publicly in
Legion

to

no

state

Utah
liquor

in

State

store.

Liquor

Stores).

The

Further, the Legion never

provided Harju with either liquor or wine.
2.

Subsection

providing liquor

or wine

32-1-36.5(1)(1)
to minors.

only

applies

The Legion never provided

either liquor or wine to Harju, and Harju was not a minor
time of

the accident.

to

at the

(The Driver's Report of Traffic Accident

lists Mr. Harju's birth date as March 11, 1931.)
3.
alcoholic

Section 32-7-14 only applies to those

beverages

to

persons

who provide

under the influence of liquor.

The evidence is uncontroverted that Harju had no

other alcoholic
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-15beverage

the

day

of

the

accident

other

than beer.

He was,

therefore, not under the influence of liquor.
4.

Finally, subsections 32-7-24(b) and (c) apply only

to providing

liquor to persons apparently under the influence of

liquor.

Again, Harju was not under the

influence of

liquor and

the Legion provided him none.
It

is

apparent

that

none of the four statutory sub-

sections included in the Dram Shop Act in
the accident

may be

said to

have been

effect at

the time of

violated by the Legion.

Therefore, the Legion may not be held to have violated the Act as
a whole.
Allisen

can

Legion if the plain
Legislature are

only

maintain

meanings

and

this

action

definitions

tortured beyond reason.

against the

set

out

Although Allisen may be

able to point out a logical weakness in the overall
the Dram

Shop Act

in effect

remedy for such weakness is
statute.

at the
for

the

by the

time of

structure of

the accident, the

Legislature

to

amend the

That is exactly what was done two year ago, as will be

discussed in the next section.
retroactively

deprives

conduct could result in

the

Meanwhile, to apply those changes
Legion

liability and

concepts of procedural fairness.

of

any

notice

that their

thus violates fundamental
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-16POINT NO. II
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE UTAH
DRAM SHOP ACT MAKES IT EVIDENT THAT
THE VERSION OF THAT ACT IN EFFECT
AS OF JANUARY 30, 1985 DID NOT
CREATE DRAM
SHOP LIABILITY FOR
GIVING,
SELLING
OR
OTHERWISE
PROVIDING BEER.
If there

could have been any doubt as to the Dram Shop

Act's coverage in January 1985, that

doubt was

Utah State

actions with regard to that

Act.

Legislature's subsequent

dispelled by the

In 1985 the Utah Legislature repealed the old

replaced it

Title 32 and

with Title 32A which became effective in July, 1985.

The Utah Dram Shop
Beverage Control

Act became
Act (Title

Chapter 14
32A).

of the

new Alcoholic

Dram shop liability was not

expanded beyond its previous dimensions under the newer Act.
There had been

widespread

criticism

of

the pre-1986

Dram Shop Act's exclusion of beer from its coverage.
in its Memorandum in
the lower

Support of

Motion for

Summary Judgment in

court, included an Affidavit of Jerry D. Fenn.

of that affidavit is attached hereto as Appendix B.
chaired

the

(hereafter
created,

Clearfield,

Citizens'
the

Council

"Council").

bi-partisan

group

on
The

Alcoholic
Council

was

A copy

In 1985 Fenn

Beverage Control
a statutorily-

formed to consider, investigate and

inquire into all matters related to the liquor laws of Utah.
Utah Code Ann. Section 32A-1-22 (1985).

See
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-17Fenn's

Affidavit

describes

the genesis of the Report

and Recommendation of the Citizen1s Council on Alcoholic Beverage
Control

to

the

Fenn's Affidavit.

Utah

Legislature.

Prepared

recommended expanding

That report is included in

in the

the coverage

summer of

1985, the Report

of the Utah Dram Shop Act to

include coverage for those who provide

beer.

The Report states

at pages 8 and 9:
The dram shop statute (the "Statute") presently
creates liability only for those giving, selling or
otherwise providing "liquor."
The Statute does not
encompass beer. By limiting the statute to "liquor",
only a small percentage of those who furnish alcoholic
beverages are subjected to liability.
Intoxication
stemming from the consumption of beer is clearly a
significant issue facing society.
The incidents of
beer-induced intoxication are not minimal. The Council
is of the opinion that those who sell, give or otherwise provide beer to others should not escape the
consequences for their actions in circumstances where
those who
furnish liquor would be liable.
The
Citizens1 Council recommends an
amendment to the
Statute to encompass all "alcoholic beverages."
Apparently,

because

of

the Utah

Grocers' Association,

beer was

not totally abolished.

a vigorous lobbying effort by

among others,

the exclusion for

Instead, the Act, as amended in

1986, provides liability only for any person who directly "gives,
sells, or

otherwise provides

consumption on the premises,
that providers

of "liquor"

where the liquor is consumed.

liquor, or
any alcoholic
are still

at a location allowing
beverage ..."

Note

held liable regardless of

The broader coverage for those who
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-18provide "alcoholic

beverages" (which

for those providers
This exception

who

allow

includes beer) is reserved

consumption

excludes grocers

and others

on

their premises.

who sell only beer,

and who do not allow it to be consumed on their premises.
The changes adopted by

the

Utah

Legislature

in 1986

clearly show that the Legislature believed that the Dram Shop Act
in effect in 1985 did cover those who provided only "light beer".
Their

amendment

of

the

statute,

taking place at the time, shows
"alcoholic beverages"
purview.
"liquor."

in the context of the debate

that it

needed to

to mean

that the term

be used to bring beer under its

The pre-1986 versions of the Dram Shop Act covered only
Again, it

must be presumed that the Legislature says

what it means and means what it says.
amend the

was felt

Dram Shop
that the

Its

deliberate effort to

Act to include beer can only be interpreted

legislature did

not believe

beer was covered

prior to that time.
POINT NO. Ill
IF THE LEGION IS FOUND LIABLE UNDER
THE UTAH DRAM SHOP ACT, IT IS
ENTITLED TO CONTRIBUTION FROM OTHER
TORTFEASORS WHO CONTRIBUTED TO THE
ACCIDENT.
Clearfield and

the other

third-party defendants, UDOT

and UP&L, argued below that the legislative intent underlying the
Utah Dram Shop Act militates against allowing contribution from a
third-party defendant.

It

is

correct

that

the

Act requires
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-19suppliers of

intoxicants to

assume liability for damages caused

to third parties by the consumers of those intoxicants.
Shop Act, however, does not exist in a vacuum.

The Dram

Other legislative

pronouncements also apply.

was

the

A substantial cause of

the

negligent

maintenance of the intersection

design

and

where the accident occurred.
waive governmental

To

for defective, unsafe,

any highway,

road, street, crosswalk

Utah Code Ann. Section 63-30-8 (1953, as amended)
excuse

UDOT

and

Clearfield

for

conditions at that intersection simply because
into this

the

abominable

they were brought

action by the Legion instead of Allisen would directly

thwart the Legislature's intent in passing
Immunity Act.
party defendants
determined that

Since

the only

could

be

which

found

their

be

the Utah Governmental

circumstances under which third-

their negligence

those entities would only
verdict

injuring Allisen

The Utah State Legislature chose to

immunity specifically

or dangerous conditions of
or sidewalk.

accident

liable

be

if

it was

caused the accident, and since

assessed

negligence

would

for

caused,

that

portion

and since any and

of a
all

contribution would go to Allisen, the intended beneficiary of the
legislature's protection,

the third

have been dismissed from the lawsuit.

party defendants should not
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THE LEGION IS ENTITLED TO CONTRIBUTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE UTAH
LEGISLATURE ABOLISHED CONTRIBUTION
AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE.
Clearfield, UDOT, and UP&L
court that

also

argued

in

the trial

since the Utah Legislature did away with the right to

contribution pursuant

to

Utah

comparative

negligence statutes

adopted in 1986, Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-27-38-40, they cannot
now be liable for
the mistaken

contribution.

This contention

notion that since the right to contribution "vests11

at the time when the tortfeasor has paid
share

of

is based upon

liability,

and

since

the

more than

its pro rata

right to contribution was

abolished prior to the time when the Legion actually had to write
out a check to Allisen, that Clearfield, UDOT and UP&L escape all
liability.
A tortfeasor
from a

may not

co-tortfeasor until

be able

it actually

to receive contribution
pays more

rata portion of damages, but the common liability
co-tortfeasor's obligation
tortious conduct.
St. P.

M. &

rests is

created at

In Employers Mutual

than its pro
upon which the

the time of the

Casualty Co.

v. Chicago,

0. Ry. Co., 235 Minn. 304, 309; 50 N.W.2d 689, 693;

cited approvingly in Farmers

Insurance

Exchange

y^_

Hewitt, 143 N.W.2d 230, 234 (Minn 1966) the court said:

YJJJjage_of
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-21... 'Common Liability1 exists immediately
after the acts of the tortfeasors which give
rise to a cause of action against them.
[Citations omitted.] But, in addition to the
requirement of common liability, the right to
contribution rests on a payment by one which
thereby relieves the other from liability.
Thus, there is a distinction between
underlies the
payment to

right to

contribution and

fulfill one's

obfuscated that

the common

liability which

the right to immediate

obligation to

contribute.

Clearfield

distinction in an effort to avoid the conclusion

that Clearfield's (and the other third-parties') common liability
existed at

the point

section caused the
abolished

in time

when the

accident.

contribution

before

condition of the inter-

The

fact

that

the

Legion

the Legislature

actually had to pay

Allisen is irrelevant.
Clearfield's argument below
(and the

Legion's) position

Dram Shop Act to
Clearfield

that

of

the

beer.

be applied

arose

modification.

to

that

Clearfield has correctly argued
Shop Act

demonstrate that

the time of the
statutory

accident.

modifications

Regarding contribution,

to a

of

In

Comparative
action which

contrast,

however,

changes to

the Dram

version was in effect at

Consistent logic
be

the

cause of

that later

the earlier

with its

applicability of the

modification

Negligence Act ought to
prior

inconsistent

regarding the

providers

argues

is

prospectively

dictates that both
applied.

Thus, any
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-22change in

the Comparative

Negligence Act

should not affect the

Legion's right to contribution in this case.
Clearfield's reliance below on Unigard Insurance Co. v.
City of

LaVerkin, 689

P.2d 1344

(Utah 1984)

that case the Utah Supreme Court was faced

is misplaced.

with the

In

prospect of

having to dismiss a claim for contribution against a governmental
agency

which

because the

allowed

a

dangerous

city claimed

The court

condition

to develop

that over a year had elapsed since the

accident, and, therefore, the
claim.

road

Sovereign Immunity

Act barred the

refused to dismiss the claim for contribution

based upon the Utah

State Legislature's

basic policy underlying

the Comparative Negligence Act, "which was designed to spread the
loss for injuries among all who are responsible."
Spreading the
sible

for

Id.

at 1346.

loss for Allisen's injuries to all who are responthem

requires

reversing

third-party

defendants'

dismissal.
If

the

third-party

defendants'

dismissal

reversed, a most unjust situation could be created.
Legion

was

the Legion
entirety

sued

despite the

held jointly

Allisen's

already paid by

not

Because the

before contribution was modified, conceivably,

could be
of

is

damages

Harju's

fact the

and severally

liable for the

(less the approximately $52,000

insurance

carrier).

This

could occur

Legion may have only been slightly respon-

sible for those injuries.

Such a result

would flip

on its head
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Legislature's

coupled with

purpose

in

reducing exposure

doing

away

to liability

with

contribution,

to that proportion

representing its fault.
POINT NO. V
THE LEGION,
UDOT AND UP&L ARE
"JOINT
TORTFEASORS"
WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE UTAH COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE ACT.
Clearfield,
Summary

Judgment

UDOT

on

and

the

UP&L

argument

based

their

Motion

for

that they ought not be held

liable for contribution because they were not "joint tortfeasors"
with the

Legion, and,

therefore, could not be liable under Utah

Code Ann. Section 78-27-39 (1953,
definition

"joint

or more

been

tort-feasor" found in Section 78-27-40(3)

person or

recovered

against

definition and the facts
third-party

The statutory

tort-feasor1 means one

persons, jointly or severally liable in tort for

the same injury to
has

amended).

"As used in this section, !joint

states:
of two

of

as

defendants

property, whether
all

or some of them."

as taken
are

or not judgment

for purposes

Under this

of this appeal,

certainly "joint tort-feasors" with

the Legion.
Prosser has
which surround

described

the terms

the

confusion

"joint tort" and "joint tort-feasors".

W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, Section 46 (1984).
are the

various meanings

and uncertainty

given to

those terms.

There described
An example of
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diversity

is

apparent

in

the

recent Utah Supreme Court

decision of Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1986).
Court

was

faced

vicariously

liable

employee, was

only

for

to be

of contribution.
was

with

the
an

question
automobile

whether
accident

involving his

Despite the employer's contention that since he
liable

under the doctrine of respondeat

superior, the Court held that

the

feasor.

Court

doing

so

the

employer
relied

was

case of

Blackshear v.

a

joint tort-

upon the definition

contained in Section 78-27-40(3) at issue here.
approvingly the

an employer,

considered a joint tort-feasor for purposes

derivatively

In

of

The

The Court cited

Clark, 391 A.2d 747, 748

(Del. 1978):
The basis of liability is not relevant, nor
is the relationship among those libel for the
tort.
In short, it makes no difference
whether the [master's] liability is based
upon the doctrine of respondeat superior or
any other legal concept.
The point is that
both it and the [servant] are (at least)
"severally" liable for the same injury to
plaintiff . . . (emphasis in original).
Contrast that definition

with

the

discussion

of the

basis for contribution under joint liability in Farmers Insurance
Exchange v. Village of Hewitt, 143 N.W.2d at 233.
also a

dram shop

action.

arguing that it could not be
its possible

That case was

The would-be contributor defended by
held liable

for contribution since

liability was statutorily distinct from that of the

ALLISEN v. AMERICAN LEGION POST
NO. 134, et al.
Appellant's Brief

Case No. 880031

-25seeker of contribution (similar to Clearfield's
The

Court

rejected

that

argument

saying, "Contribution rests on
negligence or

joint tort.

and

common

Common

arguments here).

required

liability,

It is

not

on joint

liability exists when two or

more actors are liable to an injured party for the
even though

contribution

same damages,

their liability may rest on different grounds."

interesting that

"common liability"

while the

Id.

Minnesota Court distinguished

from "joint tort", the definition it gave for

"common liability" is virtually

identical to

definition of "joint tort-feasor".

the Utah statutory

Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-

40(3).
Clearfield attempted to bolster
analogizing
liability.

Dram

Shop

Act

liability

employees, that

tort-feasor with a
Phillips is

Dram

Shop

inapposite for

however, these

Company v.

614 P.2d 153 (Utah 1980), Clearfield reasoned

that since an employer cannot be
of its

below by

to Workers' Compensation

Citing Phillips v. Union Pacific Railroad

Hammary Furniture,

to one

its argument

a joint

tortfeasor with regard

a third-party
under

a

civil

cannot be a joint
damages statute.

a variety of reasons.

distinctions exist

To summarize,

between Workers' Compensation

and the Utah Dram Shop Act:
1.

Workers' Compensation is an insurance statute; the

Dram Shop Act defines a tort.

As the Phillips Court held, "Our
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-26statute defines joint tort-feasor as one
jointly or

severally liable

liability of
tort

the employer

liability

employee

be

at

in

(emphasis in

all,

the

in tort

for the

[under Worker's
but

course

original)

of two

only
and

same injury.

The

Compensation] is not

required
scope

or more persons

that

of

Phillips at 154.

the

the injured
employment."

Regardless of whether

liability is based upon a negligence standard or strict liability
(a question

discussed in

must engage in some
result.

the next section) a Dram Shop operator

wrongful conduct

for liability to

That, of course, is not true for an employer to be found

liable under Workers' Compensation.
then, is

in order

surely similar

Dram

enough to

Shop

Act liability,

negligence under the govern-

mental Immunity Act to allow for joint liability between the two.
2.

Workers' Compensation

remedies

generally provide

specified number of weeks of an employee's salary in exchange for
the loss of a particular appendage or organ.

In

contrast, Dram

Shop liability results in traditional tort measures of damages.
3.

Workers'

Compensation

employer's liability, while the
time

of

the

accident

not.

Act in

limits

of

To allow contribution from an

ceiling.

No such difficulty exists under the Dram Shop Act.

servant

vicarious

Act

employee

liability

liability

which

an

effect at the

might

Shop

an

Dram shop

the

employer

Dram

permit

did

sets

to

exceed

that liability

is more akin to the masterallowed

contribution under
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Krukiewicz than
tion

under

Phillips.

which precluded contribu-

The distinction between common law tort

liability and liability under the Dram Shop Act which Clearfield,
UDOT and

UP&L urged

irrelevant.

in the

court below is both nonexistent and

Joint liability

ought be

allowed with

a right of

contribution between the Legion and Clearfield, UDOT and UP&L.
POINT NO. VI
THE STANDARD OF CARE IMPOSED BY THE
UTAH DRAM SHOP ACT OWED BY ONE WHO
SERVES ALCOHOL IN VIOLATION OF ITS
TERMS NEEDS TO BE CLARIFIEp.
This final
for the

Legion to

point will
be raising

doubtless appear
at this

judicial economy requires it be raised
so

might

very

well

after trial (if a
related

to

the

result

trial is

point.

a strange one

Consideration of

now, since

failing to do

in the necessity of another appeal
ordered at

inapplicability

of

all given
the

Dram

the arguments
Shop Act to the

Legion).
The lower court held in its June 24,
Utah

Dram

provider

Act
of

negligent

is

the

before

must

liability

provide

the

attaches.

alcohol
Allisen

authority from several jurisdictions in her Memorandum of
Support
Dram

of

Motion

statutes

that the

a negligence-based statute, meaning that the
intoxicants

manner

1986, ruling

to

Strike

impose

strict

in a
cited
Law in

Defense for the proposition that
liability

without

negligence.
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Klemesrud, 197

N.W.2d 614

(Iowa 19 7 2); Feuerherm v.

Ertelt, 286 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1979); Nelson v.
637 (111.

1977).

Araiza, 372 N.E.2d

This authority was also cited for the proposi-

tion that comparative negligence is inapplicable and irrelevant.
While the
must be

District

shown favors

Court to review that
this appeal

Court's

position

that negligence

the Legion, it would be opportune for this
standard at

fails, and

the Utah

this time.
Dram shop

If

the thrust of

is held to apply to

providers of beer in 1985, it would be of benefit to all

to know

with certainty what the standard of care owed should be under the
Dram Shop Act.

That way,

present evidence

if a

trial is

held the

parties can

appropriate to that level of care and avoid the

possibility of another appeal later, as

well as

the possibility

of yet another trial.
10. CONCLUSION
A single

finding that

the Dram

Shop Act in effect at

the time of the accident complained of herein

does not

apply to

suppliers of "beer", and therefore the Legion in this case, would
dispense of all issues.
legislative

history

The plain meaning of the statute and its

both

however, this Court is

strongly

not persuaded

support that position.
to dismiss

If,

this action on

that basis, then guidance is needed regarding issues of contribu-
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-29tion, joint

and several

liability, apportioning

of damages and

finally, the standard of care required by the Utah Dram Shop Act,
and whether comparative negligence applies.
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16-6-13.1

CORPORATIONS

revoke club charter and fine club for
certain violations of Liquor Control Act
does not impliedly repeal this section giving the secretary of state similar powers
where he finds a violation of the statutes
under which the charter was granted, the
two laws, in combination, do not constitute
unconstitutional excessne lines and punishments. Bowling Club \ Toronto, 17
U. (2d) 5, 403 P. 2d 651.
Failure to participate in hearing.
Bowling club which failed to participate
m relocation hearing waived right to
claim secretary of state erred in basing
his decision to revoke on unsworn testimony. Bowling Club v. Toronto, 17 U.
(2d) 5, 403 P. 2d 651.

on then respective premises, thereby subjecting them also to regulation by secretary of state. Salt Lake City v. Towne
House Athletic Club, 18 U. (2d) 417, 424
P. 2d 442.
City ordinance regulating and licensing
nonprofit clubs or associations, which established the same requirements for license
as state did for charter arid which provided for revocation of license m substantially the same teims as state law
providing for revocation o^ charter, was
unconstitutional as encroaching upon jurisdiction of secretary of statej State v. Salt
Lake City, 21 U (2d) 318, 445 P. 2d 691,
distinguished at 25 U. (^d) 333, 481
P. 2d 669
Collateral References.
C l u b s ^ ^ , Intoxicating L^quors^^lS.
14 CJ.S. Clubs § 4 , 48 CJ.S. Intoxicating Liquors §§38, 39.
Licensing of social clubs, 45 Am. Jur. 2d
577, Intoxicating Liquors § 130.

Municipal regulation.
By enacting statute providing for regulation by secretary of state of clubs on
whose premises liquor is stored and consumed, legislature did not intend to preclude municipal corporation from licensing and regulating nonprofit social clubs,
e\en though liquor is stoied and consumed

Status and rights of on0 renting room
in club, 32 A. L. R. 1016.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Construction prior to amendment.
Where secretary of state sent notice of
hearing on l evocation of charter to corporate officers instead ot corporation itself
it was a deviation tiom the notice requirement (prior to the 1955 amendment), but
tested by the "fair play" theory of due
process, the corporation had actual notice,
appeared at the hearing, and was afforded
opportunity to defend against the charges
brought. Entie Nous Club v. Toronto, 4 U.
(2d) 98, 287 P. 2d 670.

Although this section (prior to amendment) provided no means of giving the notice required it did not follow that the
Rules of Civil Procedure governed the issuance of process, the Ifcules were for
formal contests between adverse parties
and clearly were inapplicable to a proceeding befoie an administrative body
seeking to regulate activities burdened
with a public interest. Entre Nous Club
v. Toronto, 4 U. (2d) 98, 2^7 P. 2d 670.

16-6-13.1. Clubs storing or permitting consumption of liquor on premises
—Bond—Filing of articles, bylaws and house rules—Federal malt liquor
revenue stamp—Establishment of state liquor store—Restrictions.—(1)
Every social club, recreational or athletic association, or kindred association, incorporated under the provisions of this chapter, which now maintains or intends to maintain premises upon which liquor | is or will be
stored or consumed must procure and file with the Utah liquor control commission and maintain thereafter a cash or corporate surety bond payable
to the state of Utah, in the amount of $7500. The bond shall be in any
form approved by the attorney general and shall be conditioned upon the
iaithful compliance by the nonprofit corporation, its officers, agents, and
employees with the provisions of this chapter and the Utah Liquor Control
Act of 1969 as amended, and regulations of the commission adopted thereunder No part of any cash bond so posted may be withdrawn either during
the period the license is in effect, or while revocation proceedings are pending against the licensee, or for a period of six months thereafter. A bond
14
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filed by a licensee under the provisions of this section shall be forfeited if
the license of a licensee is finally revoked. Upon final revocation, the attorney general shall undertake necessary procedures to collect the bond
and pay the proceeds to the state treasurer.
(2) Each club or association required by this chapter to file a $7500
bond shall submit a copy of its articles, bylaws and house rules to the
Utah liquor control commission, and each club or association shall abide
by and conform to its articles, bylaws and house rules. A copy of the
articles, bylaws and house rules and any amendments thereto shall be kept
on file with the Utah liquor control commission at all times.
(3) All social clubs, recreational, athletic or kindred associalions organized pursuant to this chapter which have procured and filed a $7,500 bond
as required by this section and which have on file with the Utah liquor
control commission a copy of their articles, bylaws and house rules, and
are abiding by them and the provisions of this chapter and the Utah Liquor
Control Act of 1969 and regulations of the commission adopted thereunder,
may hold a United States retail malt liquor revenue stamp and at the
same time permit members to have, hold, store or possess liquor in or on
premises described in such stamp.
(4) The so-called "locker system" for the storage and serving of
intoxicating liquors shall be legal in this state only when operated by a
nonprofit corporation in compliance with the terms and provisions of this
chapter and the provisions of the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, and
the regulations of the commission adopted thereunder.
(5) Under the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, the regulations
adopted thereunder, and the provisions of this chapter, the Utah liquor
control commission may establish a state store on premises of a social
club, recreation, athletic or other kindred association.
(6) Any social club, recreational, athletic, or other kindred association seeking to have a state liquor store located on its premises, shall have
a valid license issued by the Utah liquor control commission, file a written
application with the commission in the form prescribed, accompanied by
an application fee of $25, the written consent of the local authority as
defined in the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, satisfactory documentary
proof that the applicant is currently licensed to and does operate a place
where a variety of hot food is prepared and cooked and complete meals
are served in connection with indoor dining accommodations, satisfactory
proof that the applicant is in compliance with the provisions of this chapter
and the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, and the regulations adopted
thereunder, and that the proposed vendor can qualify for and obtain the
bond specified in section 32-1-37 of the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969
Every application shall contain a scaled floor plan of the social club,
recreational, athletic, or other kindred association, including that part
thereof in which applicant proposes that a state store be established and
shall set forth any other information as the commission may direct If a
state store is so established, liquor or wine may not be stored or sold in
any other place than as designated and approved by the commission.
15
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(7) The Utah liquor control commission may refuse to locate a state
liquor store in any social club, recreational, athletic, or otheit kindred
association whose officer, director, managing agent or employee has been
convicted of a felony or of violation of any ordinance, state or federal law
concerning the sale, delivery or transportation of an alcoholic beverage, or
who has forfeited bond to appear in court to answer charges of having
committed a felony or having violated any such laws or ordinances, or has
pleaded guilty to a charge of having committed a felony, or ha£ violated
any such law or ordinance, or who has been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
(8) In those instances where a state liquor store is established on
premises occupied by a social club, recreational, athletic, or other kindred
association, the following restrictions shall apply:
(a) The state liquor store must remain locked at all times ^vhen it is
not open for business.
(b) The state store shall not stock or sell any liquor except m original
unbroken containers.
(c) No minor shall be employed by any vendor to sell or dispense any
alcoholic beverage.
(d) No vendor, officer, director, managing agent or employee, nor
any other person employed by or acting for or in behalf of any licensee,
shall sell, deliver or furnish, or cause or permit to be sold, delivered or
furnished any liquor or wine t o :
(i) Any minor;
(ii) Any person actually, apparently or obviously drunk ;
(iii) Any known habitual drunkard;
(iv) Any known interdicted person.
(e) Every lease, contract or other arrangement under which a state
store is established in a social club, recreational, athletic or other kindred
association shall be in writing and contain a provision to the effect that it
is terminable at the option of the state, with or without cause, and without liability of any kind to the state.
(f) There shall be no advertising or other rerference to the sale of
liquor, except as provided in section 32-1-36.5 (n).
(g) No liquor or wine shall be sold or offered for sale at said stores
during the following hours:
(i) On any day of a general or primary election until afte^r the time
when the polls are closed.
(ii) On Sunday and legal holidays after 12:00 midnight and prior
to 12:00 noon.
(h) No provision in this act or the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969,
shall be construed to prevent a social club, recreational, athletic or other
kindred association which is licensed to and does operate a place where
a variety of hot food is prepared and cooked and complete meals are
served in connection with indoor dining accommodations, or a restaurant,
from purchasing, storing or using flavoring and cooking wihes, liqueur
16
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and cordials Tor flavoring and cooking purposes, but no sucli wines, liqueurs
or cordials shall be sold as a beverage.
History: C. 1953, 16-6-13.1, enacted b y
L. 1955, ch. 25, § 2; L. 1969, ch. 37, § 4.
CompUer's Notes.
The 1969 amendment rewrote this section which provided for a $5,000 bond filed
with the secretary of state, dictated the
form of the bond and enumerated items to
be included in the club's constitution, bylaws a n d / o r house rules; the amendment
divided the section into numbered subsections, in subsec. (4) added "and the
provisions of the Utah Liquor Control
Act * * # adopted thereunder" and added
subsecs. (5) to (8).
Constitutionality.
Although provision regarding the "locker
system" for storing and serving liquor
is amendatory of sections 32-1-8 and 32-7-3
of the Liquor Control Act there is no
violation of the constitutional prohibition

against the passage of a bill containing
more than one subject (Art. V I , § 2 3 ) ,
since the amended sections relate directly
to the general subject of the act. Kent
Club v. Toronto, 6 U. (2d) 67, 305 P . 2d
870.
Act was not unconstitutionally discriminatory on ground that $3,000 bond was so
high that only financially affluent clubs
could afford it. K e n t Club v. Toronto, 6
U. (2d) 07, 305 P. 2d 870.
Forfeiture of bond.
Where nonprofit corporation pleaded
guilty to violation of state liquor law,
action of court in fining corporation
$1,000 did not affect corporation's liability
under its bond given to the secretary of
state and did not preclude forfeiture of
bond posted in accordance wtih the statute.
Disabled American Veterans' Club v. Toronto, 12 U. (2d) 213, 364 P . 2d 830.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
C onstitutionality.
Former requirements t h a t club charter
contain limitations on "number of members consistent" with the nature and purposes of the club, provide for "leasonable
initiation fees and dues," have "reasonable
regulations for the dropping of members
for nonpayment of dues or for other

causes," and have "strict regulations" for
the government of the club rooms or
quarters consistent with the nature and
purpose of the club were not unconstitutionally uncertain and ambiguous. K e n t
Club v. Toronto, 6 U. (2d) 67, 305 P . 2d
870.

16-6-13.2. Clubs storing or permitting consumption of liquor on premises
—Existing clubs.—All existing social clubs, recreational or athletic associations or kindred associations, incorporated under the provisions of this
chapter, may within sixty days immediately following the effective date
of this act file an application with the commission which it must either
grant or deny within six months from the date of filing. Any authorization
issued by the secretary of state, permitting members to have, hold, store
or possess liquor in or on club or association premises shall terminate on
the date the commission grants or denies the applicaton for a license filed
hereunder. The authorization of any such club or association not filing
an application within the sixty-day period, shall terminate at midnight
on the sixtieth day following the effective date of this act.
History: C. 1953, 16-6-13.2, enacted by
L. 1955, ch. 25, § 3 ; L. 1969, ch. 37, §10.

lowing the effective date of this a c t "
for "shall have thirty days after the
effective date of this act to comply with
the terms thereof."
Chapter 37, Laws 1969, carried no effective date clause.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1969 amendment substituted "may
within sixty days * * * sixtieth day fol-

16-6-13.3. Repealing and separability clause.—All statutes or parts
thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed. If any section or pro17
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tutional as against contentions that it ereated monopoly, constituted levy of tax
not for public purpose, was private law,
and that it was violation of due process
of law clause. Utah Manufacturers' Assn.
v. Stewart, 82 U. 198, 23 P. 2d 229.

Purpose of act.
The purpose of the former Prohibition
L a w w a s n o t only to prevent traffic in
intoxicating liquors, but also to prevent
transportation. State v. Davis, 55 U. 54
i 8 4 p. 161#
'

32-1-2. Deemed exercise of police powers—Liberally construed.—This
act shall be deemed an exercise of the police powers of the state for the
protection of the public health, peace and morals; to prevent the recurrence of abuses associated with saloons; to eliminate the evils of unlicensed
and unlawful manufacture, selling and disposing of alcoholic beverages;
and all provisions of this act shall be liberally construed for the attainment
of these purposes.
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, § 2; C. 1943,
46-0-44.
Effect * legislative aedaration.
Mere declaration by legislature that an
act is within exercise of police power is
not binding on courts unless it is within
the recognized scope of such power. That
the prohibition or regulation of alcohol
and other intoxicating liquors is an exercise of the police power of the state admits of no doubt. Utah Manufacturers'
Assn. v. Stewart, 82 U. 198, 23 P. 2d 229.

CoUateral References.
Intoxicating Liquors<^6.
« « S . Into^cating L ^ s J ^
u o r s a 23.
Law Review.
,
California v. La Rue (93 Sup. (Jt. 390)—
The Supreme Court's New Overbreadth
Doctrine, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 320.

32-1-3. Definitions.—As used in this act:
"Alcoholic beverage" means and includes "beer" and "liquor" as they
are defined herein.
"Application" means a formal written request for the issuance of a
permit or license.
"Beer" means any beverage containing not less than one-half of one per
centum of alcohol by weight and obtained by the alcoholic fermentation
of an infusion or decoction of any malted grain or similar products. "Heavy
beer" means beer containing more than 3.2 per centum of alcohol by weight.
"Light beer" means beer containing not more than 3.2 per centum of
alcohol by weight. Beer may or may not contain hops or other vegetable
products. "Beer" includes ale, stout and porter.
"Brewer" means any person engaged in manufacturing beer.
"Commission" means "Utah liquor control commission."
"Council" means citizens' council.
"Dentist" means a person holding a valid and unrevoked license to
practice dentistry under the laws of the state of Utah.
"Druggist" or "pharmacist" means any person holding a valid and
unrevoked license as a registered pharmacist under the laws of the state
of Utah and who is actually in good faith engaged in the business of
compounding and dispensing drugs or medicines.
"Drugstore" or "pharmacy" shall be as defined by the statutes of Utah.
"Interdicted person" means a person to whom the sale of liqtior is prohibited by an order made under this act.
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"Liquor" means and includes alcohol, or any alcoholic, spirituous,
vinous, fermented, malt, or other liquid or combination of liquids, a part
of which is spirituous, vinous, or fermented, and all other drinks or
drinkable liquids, containing more than one-half of one per centum of
alcohol by weight; and all mixtures, compounds or preparations, whether
liquid or not, which contain more than one-half of one per centum of alcohol
by weight, and which are capable of human consumption; except that
the term "liquor" shall not include "light beer."
"Local authority" means (a) the board of county commissioners of the
county in which the premises are located if the premises are located in an
unincorporated area of the county or (b) the governing body of the
city or town in which the premises are located if the premises are located
in an incorporated city or town.
"Manufacture" means to distill, brew, rectify, blend, mix, compound,
process, ferment, or otherwise make any alcoholic beverage as defined
in this act.
"Minor" means any person under the age of twenty-one years.
"Package" shall mean any container, bottle, vessel, or other receptacle
immediately containing liquor.
"Package agency" means an outlet authorized by the commission to sell
original package liquor or wine for consumption off the premises.
"Person" includes any individual, firm, copartnership, corporation, association, or any group or combination, and the plural as well as the singular number, unless the intent to give a more limited meaning is disclosed by
the context.
"Physician" means a person holding a valid and unrevoked license to
practice medicine and surgery in the state of Utah.
"Premises" means any room, enclosure, building or structure where
alcoholic beverages may be lawfully manufactured, stored, sold, or consumed
as provided in this act.
"Prescription" means a writing in the form prescribed by the regulations, signed by a physician, and given by him to a patient for the obtaining
of liquor pursuant to this act for use for medicinal purposes only.
"Public place" shall mean and include any place, building or conveyance, to which the public has, or is permitted to have access, and any
highway, street, lane, park or place of public resort or amusement, and
any other place which, under the provisions of this act, has been declared to
be a public place.
"Regulations" means regulations made by the commission.
"Residence" means and includes any building, or part of a building,
where a person resides, but shall not include any part of a building which
is not actually and exclusively used as a private residence, nor any part of
a hotel other than a private guest room, nor a club or any part thereof,
nor any place from which there is access to a club or hotel except through
a street or lane or other open and unobstructed means of access, nor any
portion of a building used in part for business purposes unless such portion
is separated from the part used for business purposes by a wall or walls
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having no doors or other means of access opening into such part used
for business purposes.
"Restaurant" means a place of business where a variety of hot food
is prepared and cooked and complete meals are served to the general
public in connection with indoor dining accommodations.
"Retailer" means any person engaged in the sale or distribution of
alcoholic beverages to \he consumer.
"Sell" or "to sell" when used in this act in any prohibition, shall be construed to include: to solicit or receive an order for; to keep or expose for
sale; to deliver for value; to peddle; to possess with intent to sell; to
traffic in; for any consideration, promised or obtained, directly or indirectly,
or under any pretext or by any means whatsoever, to procure or allow
to be procured for any other person; and "sale," when so used, shall
include every act of selling as above defined.
"State store" shall mean an outlet for the bale of liquor located on
premises owned or leased by the state of Utah.
"Wholesaler" means any person other than a manufacturer, engaged
in the importation for sale, or in the sale of alcoholic beverages in wholesale or jobbing quantities to the commission or to retailers.
* "Wine" includes any alcoholic beverage obtained by the fermentation
of the natural sugar content of fruits, plants, honey or milk, whether or
not other ingredients are added.
History; 3X 1935, ch. 43, § 3; C. 1943,
46-0-45; L. 1969, ch. 83, §2.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1969 amendment inserted "Council,"
"Local authority," "Minor," "Pack-igc
agency," "Premises," "Restaurnnt," and
"State store" in the list of definitions;
and deleted "or gratuitously" after "valuc" in the definition of "Sell" or "to sell."
"Light beer" defined.
That light beer as defined in this scc-

tion, even if nonintoxicating, is a proper
subject for the exercise of the state's police power is undoubted. Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 89 U.
183, 51 P. 2d 645.
CoUateral References.
Intoxicating LiquorsC=>122.
48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 201.
45 Am. Jur. 2d 488, Intoxicating Liq.
uors § 4.

32-1-4. Nonpartisan.—It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
state that the administration of this act shall be nonpartisan.
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, §4; 0. 1943,
46-0-46.
Collateral References.
Intoxicating Liquors€=>lll.

48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 192.
45 Am. Jur. 2d 488, Intoxicating Liq.
uors § 3.

32-1-5. Liquor control commission—Members—Terms—CompensationVacancies—Oath and bond—Quorum.—(a) Upon approval of this act the
term of office of the present liquor control commission shall expire.
Thereafter the liquor control commission shall be comprised of three commissioners to be appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate.
Immediately upon approval of this act the governor shall appoint one
commissioner to hold office for a period of two years, one to hold office
for a period of four years, and one to hold office for a period of six years.
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liability or loss on account of damage to or destruction of property of any
or every description, including liability of the commission for the resultant
loss of use of such property, resulting from accident due to the ownership, maintenance or use of any such motor vehicle. The commission shall
be liable to respond in damages in all such cases if a private corporation
under the same circumstances would be liable.
(b) The written consent of the governor as required by section 32-1-28
shall not be required to proceed against the commission under this section.
The provisions set forth in chapter 30 of Title 63 shall apply in all actions
so commenced; however, immunity from suit against the council or the
qommission, or against any official, officer, examiner or member of the
council or commission, is in all respects retained except as provided in
section 32-1-26 of this act, and for damages sustained as a result of the
ownership, maintenance or use of motor vehicles as set forth in subsection
(a) of this section.
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, § 3 7 ; C. 1943,
46-0-79; L. 1969, ch. 83, § 11.

section designation
subsee. ( b ) .

"(a)";

and

added

Compilers Notes.
The 1969 amendment inserted the sub-

Collateral References.
Intoxicating Liquors<$=3lll.
48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 192.

32-1-36. State stores.—Unless otherwise prohibited, stores to be known
as state liquor stores may be established by the commission at such places
m the state as considered advisable for the sale of liquor in accordance
with the provisions of this act and the regulations made thereunder.
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, § 3 8 ; C. 1943,
46-0-80.
Legal authority to sell "hard" liquor.
By the Liquor Control Act the excluj,ive right to sell intoxicating beverages,
other than light beer, is in the state.
Higgms v. District Court of Salt Lake
County, 89 U. 183, 51 P. 2d 645.
Validity.
There is nothing in our state Constitution which prohibits the state legisUture from enacting a law putting the
.tite into the liquor business; or to pre\ent it from engaging in the sale and

distribution of intoxicating liquors. Article X I I , § 20 of the Constitution does not
apply to the state. Riggins v. District
Court of Salt Lake County, 89 U. 183,
51 p
- 2d 645.
Collateral References.
Intoxicating LiquorsC=»128.
48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 211.
45 Am. Jur. 2d 644, Intoxicating Liquors
§ 228.
Constitutionality of statutes providing
for sale of intoxicating liquor by a state
or state agencies, 121 A. L. K. 300.

32-1-36.5. State store on premises occupied by restaurant—Restrictions.—In those instances where a state liquor store is established on
premises occupied by a restaurant, the following restrictions shall apply:
(a) The consent of the local authority shall first be obtained.
(b) The stock of alcoholic beverages shall be so stored as not to be
usible to patrons of the restaurant.
(c) Liquor or wine shall not be purchased for or served to any guest
or patron of any restaurant by the vendor or by a person employed by
or in any manner for or in his behalf. Purchases must be made by the
431
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guest or patron at the site of the store approved by the commission and not
^ d r No liquor or wine shall be sold or offered for sale at said stores
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History: L. 1935, ch. 43, § 125; C. 1943,
46-0-167; L. 1969, ch. 83, §20,

and inserted "if otherwise required by
law" near the end of the section.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1969 amendment inserted "or airline" near the beginning of the section;

CoUateral References.
Intoxicating Liquors<§=3lll.
48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 192.
45 Am. Jur. 2d 503, Intoxicating Liq.
uors § 24.

32-7-13. Drinking and drunkenness in public places.—No person shall
drink liquor in a public building, park or stadium or be in an intoxicated
condition in a public place.
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, §126; 1937,
ch. 49, § 1 ; C. 1943, 46-0-168.
Comptter's Notes.
The 1937 amendment inserted "drink
liquor in a public building, park or
stadium or."
Operation of motor vehicle while intoxicated.
Following an automobile collision, defendant was sitting on curb holding a
handkerchief to his head which was bleeding; there was a strong odor of alcohol
on his breath; he appeared to be intoxicated and in fact stated that he was
drunk. A bottle containing whiskey was
found on the floor of his automobile. He
was taken to a nearby hospital where his
wounds were attended and he was placed
under arrest for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of 416-44. Under such circumstances arrest of

defendant was justified though offense
for which he was arrested was not committed in the presence of the arresting
officer. The defendant, being intoxicated
in a public place in violation of this
section, and upon death of his passengers
was charged with automobile homicide
under 76-30-7.4. State v. Bryan, 16 TJ
(2d) 47, 395 P. 2d 539.
CoUateral References.
Drunkards<S=>10.
28 C.J.S. Drunkards § 14.
45 Am. Jur. 2d 512, Intoxicating Liq.
uors § 36.
Location of offense as "public" within requirement of enactments against
drunkenness, 8 A. L. R. 3d 930.
Modern status of the rules as to voluntary intoxication as defense to criminaj
charge, 8 A. L. R. 3d 1236.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Drunkenness and intoxication.
Under Prohibition Law of 1917, drunkenness and intoxication by use of intoxicating liquors was criminal, and a mis-

demeanor, wherever and whenever occur,
ring at any place in the state. Kolb v
Peterson, 50 U. 450, 168 P. 97.

32-7-14. Sale of liquor to drunken person.—No person shall sell or
supply any alcoholic beverages or permit alcoholic beverages to be sold or
supplied to any person under or apparently under the influence of liquor.
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, § 127; C. 1943,
46-0-169.

45 Am. Jur. 2d 669, Intoxicating Liq.
uors § 265.

CoUateral References.
Intoxicating Liquors<@=al61.
48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 258.

Criminal responsibility of one authorized generally to sell intoxicating liquors
for particular illegal sale thereof by employee or agent, 139 A. L. R. 306.

32-7-15. Selling or supplying alcoholic beverages to minor prohibited—
Exception.—(1) No person shall sell or supply alcoholic beverages to any
person under the age of 21 years.
(2) This section does not apply to the supplying of liquor to a person
under the age of 21 years for medicinal purposes by the parent or guardian
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32-7-23. Possession of false or fictitious permit.—Except ais provided
by this act and the regulations, no person shall within this state have or
keep in his possession a false or fictitious permit purporting t<() authorize
the purchase of liquor or a permit of which he is not the holder.
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, § 136; C. 1943,
16-0-178.

32-7-24. Permitting drunkenness.—No person shall:
(a) permit drunkenness to take place in any house or on any premises
of which he is the owner, tenant or occupant; or
(b) permit or suffer any person apparently under the influence of
liquor to consume any liquor in any house or on any premises of which
thefirst-namedperson is owner, tenant or occupant; or
(c) give any liquor to any person apparently under the influence of
liquor.
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, §137; C. 1943,
46-0-179.

45 Am. Jur. 2d 669, Intoxicating Liquors § 265.

Collateral References.
Intoxicating Liquors<§=>161.
48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 258.

Eevocation or suspension of liquor license because of drinking or drunkenness
on part of licensee or business associates,
36 A. L. R. 3d 1301.

32-7-25. Having liquor without permit.—Except as authorized by this
act, no person, not holding a permit under this act entitling him so to do,
shall have any liquor in his possession within this state.
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, §138; C. 1943,
16-0-18O.
Collateral References.
Intoxicating Liquors€=>lll.

48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors §192.
45 Am. Jur. 2d 645, Intoxicating Liquors § 230.

32-7-26. Advertising prohibited.—The advertising of alcoholic beverages by the commission and any window display thereof in its stores are
hereby expressly prohibited, except that the commission may provide for
appropriate signs on window or front of building denoting the fact that
it is a state liquor store or package agency, and may provide for printed
price lists.
History: L. 1935, ch. 43, §139; 0. 1943,
164-181.

erages. Horman v. Liquor Control Comm.,
21 U. (2d) 294, 445 P. 2d i

-Alcoholic beverages" defined.
Light beer is included within phrase
Hlcoholie beverages." Bird & Jcx Co. v.
fank, 96 IT. 450, 85 P. 2d 831.

Collateral References.
Intoxicating Liquors<§=»lli.
48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 192.
45 Am. Jur. 2d (549, Intoxicating Liquors 8 236.

yght beer advertising.
Commission regulation providing that
jght beer might be advertised is valid
j view of 32-7-27 notwithstanding contention that 32-7-26 is general prohibi•ion against advertising all alcoholic bev-

Validity, construction, ind effect of
statutes, ordinances or regulations prohibiting or regulating advertising of intoxicating liquors, 19 A. L. |B. 2d 1114.

32-7-27. Advertising prohibition applicable to manufacturers, licensees
ind package agencies.—The prohibition against advertising alcoholic bev471
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32-9-12. Penalty for violation of act. Unless otherwise provided herein, every
person who violates this act is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 32-9-11, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 112, §2.

Compiler's Notes.
Although it was enacted as*32-9-11, the
compiler has redesignated this section as
32-9-12 since Laws 1977, ch. 137, £1 had
already enacted a 32-9-11.

CHAPTER 11
DRAM SHOP ACT
Section
32-11-1. Liability for injuries resulting from illegal sale or other distribution of intoxicating
liquors — Injured person's cause of action against intoxicated person or person
who provided liquor — Survival of action
32-11-2. Immunity of state, state agencies and employees, and political subdivisions

32-11-1. Liability for injuries resulting from illegal sale or other distribution of intoxicating liquors — Injured person's cause of action against intoxicated person or person who.provided liquor — Survival of action. (1) Any
person who gives, sells, or otherwise provides intoxicating liquor to another contrary to subsection 16-6-13.1 (8)(d), subsection 32-1-36.5 (1)(1), section 32-7-14 or
subsection 32-7-24 (b) or (c), and thereby causes the intoxication of the other person, is liable for injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third
person, or the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from the
intoxication.
(2) A person who suffers an injury referred to in subsection (1) of this section,
shall have a cause of action against the intoxicated person and the person who
provided the intoxicating liquor in violation of subsection (1) above, or either of
them.
(3) If a person having rights or liabilities under this section dies, the rights
or liabilities provided by this section shall survive to or against that person's
estate.
History: L. 1981, ch. 152, § 1.
Title of Act.
An act relating to intoxicating liquors; providing liability for injuries resulting from
illegal sale or other distribution of mtoxicating liquors; providing that claims and liabilities survive the death of a person; and pro-

viding immunity for the state, its agencies,
emplovees, and political subdivisions.
L a w s 1981> c h

152>

^ a w Reviews.
A New Perspective — Has Utah Entered
the Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981
Utah L. Rev. 495.

32-11-2. Immunity of state, state agencies and employees, and political subdivisions. No provision of this act shall create any civil liability on the part of
the state, its agencies, employees, or political subdivisions, arising out of their
activities in regulating, controlling, authorizing, or otherwise being involved in, the
sale or other distribution of intoxicating liquor.
History: L. 1981, ch 152, § 2.

184

Alcoholic Beverages

UTAH CODE
1985.1986

ce is in accordance commission in the performance o f its official duties.
ocedure for service The writ o f mandamus lies from the Supreme Court
ontain findings o f to the commission in all proper cases.
(5) A petition pending in the Supreme Court shall
oncise statement of
ctive date o f the not o f itself stay or suspend the operation o f any
d upon a prcpond- order o f the commission, although the Supreme
er of the coxnmiss- Court in its discretion may enter an order staying or
e it becomes effec- suspending in whole or in part the operation o f the
td that a permittee commission's order during pendency. The Supreme
tion of this title, or Court shall give three days' notice o f a n order
nmediately suspend staying or suspending the commission's order, and
use, and assess the after hearing, make a written finding that great or
ttee or the licensee, irreparable damage would otherwise result t o the
id, any compliance petitioner, specifying the nature o f the damage. The
>r licensee may be finding shall be based upon evidence submitted t o
vm
> or licensee whose the court and identified by reference.
leligible t o reapply
title until the exp~ 32A-1-21. Citizens' council created - Members •
date the permit or Vacancies - Quorum • Per diem allowance and
sessed by the com- expenses - Meetings - Clerical staff - Attorney
> the General Fund general.
A Citizens' Council on Alcoholic Beverage
12.
es to disciplinary Control is created which consists of seven persons
>f restaurant liquor who are citizens of the United States and the state
r licensees. If any of Utah. The governor shall appoint three members,
amission t o have two of whom hold office for a period of four years
upon the employee and one of whom holds office for a period of two
e employee from yean. The speaker of the House of Representatives
>holic beverages in and the president of the Senate shall each appoint
>eriod of up to one two members, one to a two year term and one to a
ceived three suspe- four-year term. Vacancies occurring for any reason
I a consecutive 36- are filled for the unexpired term, or for four years
n handling liquor, if due to expiration of a term, by the person then
oe year.
ins occupying the office responsible for the appointment. Four members of the council constitute a
quorum for the transaction of business. The
lure - Stay of
members appointed select one of their number as
„ any party named chairman to serve at the pleasure of the council.
>n may petition the
(a) Each council member receives a per diem
e lawfulness of the allowance as set by the Division o f Finance for each
within 30 days of day or partial day in which the member is engaged
rder. The petition in performing council business, together with all
iter than 30 days actual and necessary expenses incurred in carrying
nd shall direct the out official duties.
in the case to the
(b) The council holds meetings at times and
ty seeking review, places as may be called by the chairman or any t w o
be opposing party. members. Meetings may be open t o the public.
:edure relating to Necessary facilities to accommodate the needs o f the
ile and if not in members are provided by the lieutenant governor.
to proceedings ins4 c ) T h e council m a y hire clerical staff as it
this section,
considers necessary for the efficient transaction o f
•rmination whether its business. The attorney general shall render legal
sued its authority, assistance as requested by the council.
ler review violates
• (d) N o more than four o f the members shall b e
the Constitution of of the same political party.
isas
Utah. No new or
ntroduced in the 32A-1-22. Citizens' council - Powers and duties.
The council is independently empowered and its
II be heard o n the
Ttified by it. T h e principal duty is t o consider, investigate, and
lestions o f fact are inquire into any or all matters within the scope o f
ew. The questions or directly related to this title and matters
findings and con- concerned directly or indirectly with the administraeasonableness and tion and enforcement o f laws related t o the sale,
purchase, and consumption o f alcoholic beverages.
: Court shall enter It shall not interfere in the direction or management
k the order of the of the state alcoholic products operation. T h e
council shall prepare an annual report t o the
ourt, n o court o f governor and the Legislature setting forth, in detail,
*, reverse, correct, its activities o f the previous year. T h e council may
^mmission, or t o make recommendations concerning the same t o the
r operation of any governor, the Legislature, a n d the commission,
interfere with the setting forth, in detail, its activities o f the previous
year. The council may make recommendations con*
OODE«CO
Provo.Uu*
ATIONS, consatt the latest UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS.
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cerning the same t o the governor, the Legislature,
the commission, the director, the department, the
commissioner o f public safety or t o any other
person, commission, or agency as it considers advisable. The commission is required t o meet with the
council at least semiannually and more frequently if
requested by the commission or the council. T h e
Bureau o f Narcotics and Alcoholic Beverage Law
Enforcement o f the Department o f Public Safety
shall cooperate with the council in all matters concerning this title.
1993
32A-1-23. Citizens' council - Power to obtain information.
The council is authorized t o secure directly from
the commission, its members, the director, and department employees information concerning the
alcoholic product operations of the state; and the
commission, its members, the director, and department employees are authorized and directed to
furnish information directly t o the council upon
request.
tns
32A-1-24. Citizens' council • Hearings - Reports.
(1) The council may conduct private and public
hearings and compel the appearance o f witnesses by
subpoena. The council is not required t o make its
findings public, but shall report fully t o the
governor and the legislative council o f the Utah
State Legislature.
(2) Any council member w h o is not satisfied with
council reports or recommendations may Hie additional reports and recommendations t o the governor
and the legislative council of the Utah State Legislature.
1W3
32A-1-25. Citizens' council - May request grand
Jury.
When the council believes the public interest
demands it, the council by majority vote may
request any district judge t o summon a grand jury
for the purpose o f inquiring into actual or suspected
public offenses against this title and concerned
directly or indirectly with the administration and
enforcement o f laws related t o the sale, purchase,
and consumption of alcoholic beverages.
ins

Chapter 2. State Stores
32A-2-1. CommtaioB's power to establish state stores Limitations.
32A-2-2. State store • Coounissioa tad department duties
before estabttsaiat.
32A-2-3. OperadoaaJ restrictioas.
32A-2-4. Delivery of Uqoor to state stont.
32A-2-1. Commission's power to establish state
stores - limitations.
(1) The commission m a y establish state operated
liquor stores known as 'state stores* in numbers
and at places, owned or leased by the department,
as it considers proper for the sale of liquor, by
employees o f the state, in accordance with this title
and the rules made under this title. Employees o f
state stores are considered employees o f the department and shall meet all qualification requirements
for employment outlined in Section 32A-1-11.
(2) The power o f the commission t o establish
state stores is plenary, except as otherwise provided
by this title, and is not subject to review.
(3) The total number o f state stores shall not at
any time aggregate more than that number determined by dividing the population o f the state b y
48,000. Population is determined by the most recent
CODEKX)
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United States dece
other population d
States or state gov
ion does not appb
liquor licenses, or
are governed by
provided elsewhere
(4) N o state stoi
feet of any public
library, public play
the method in Sub
be established wit
private school, chu
round, or park me;
nearest entrance c
nearest property be
school, church, pu
or park. These pre
one of the following
(a) The comnr
ion that the premise
third class or a t
distance requiremer
exceptional practice
undue hardships i;
store. In that eve
giving full consider;
umstances, followm
town, and where p t
ncerned, authorize
requirements t o reli
if the variance ma>
detriment t o the pu
ally impairing the int
(b) With respec
store in any locati
giving full considers
umstances, followin
and where practical
reduce the proximit
church if the local ]
question gives its wri
(5) With respect
church, public libra
the 600 foot limitati
entrance o f the oi
route of either ordi
applicable, vehicula
ares, whichever is
boundary of the pi
public library, publ
nd, or park.
(6) Nothing in th
ion from considerir
onal, religious, an
other relevant fact*
proposed location,
educational facility
infant day care cc
schools.
32A-2-2. State store
duties before establi
(1) Before a state
commission, the de
tigation and hold p
gathering informati
to the commission
state store to ass
general population
shall be forwarded
determination.
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*yance is occupied or used in violation of this title
ft commission rules as described in this section, or
illows the same to be so occupied or used, the same
s subject to a lien for and may be sold to pay all
foes and costs assessed against the person guilty of
be nuisance and the lien may be enforced by action
A any court having jurisdiction.
(3) Any action to abate any nuisance defined in
[his title is brought in the name of the Department
j( Alcoholic Beverage Control in any court having
jurisdiction. It is tried as an action in equity. N o
ixjfld is required to initiate proceedings.
(4) The court may issue a temporary writ of injuaction, if it appears that the nuisance exists, retracing the defendant from conducting or permitting
the continuance o f the nuisance until the conclusion
of the trial. The court may also issue an order restraining the defendant and all other persons from
(tnoving or interfering with the alcoholic products,
packages, equipment, or other property kept or
ssed in violation of this title or commission rules.
(5) In any action to abate or enjoin any nuisance,
I is not necessary for the court to find the property
0olved was being unlawfully used at the time of
&e bearing, but on finding that the material allegaaoos of the petition or complaint are true, the court
iiall order that no alcoholic product shall be posse*td, kept, used, offered for sale, sold, given, furnshed, supplied, received, purchased, stored, warehoused, manufactured, adulterated, shipped, carried,
^imported, or distributed in the room, house,
smlding, structure, place, aircraft, vehicle, vessel,
* other conveyance or in any part of these. Upon
pigment of the court ordering abatement of the
sgisance, the court may order that the premises or
joQveyance in question shall not be occupied or
ssed for any purpose for one year. The court may
permit the premises or conveyance to be occupied
j used if its owner, lessee, tenant, or occupant
pves bond in an appropriate amount with sufficient
jirety, approved by the court, payable to the state
i Utah, and on the conditions that alcoholic
inducts will not be present therein or thereon, and
£it payment of all fines, costs, and damages that
jay be assessed for any violation of this title or
^omission rules upon the property will be made.
(6) If a tenant of any premises uses the same or
ff part thereof in maintaining a common nuisance
I defined in this section, or knowingly permits use
Uj another, the lease is rendered void, and the right
>9 possession reverts to the owner or lessor who is
[sailed to the remedy provided by law for forcible
Leauon of the premises.
(7) Any person who knowingly permits any
tatting or premises owned or leased by the person,
bunder the person's control, or any part of any
fakUng or premises, to be used in maintaining a
l^wnon nuisance as defined in this title, or who,
Ler being notified in writing by a prosecuting
Hfrer or any citizen of the unlawful use, and who
[gs to take all proper measures, either to abate the
Lance or to remove the person or persons from
U premises, is guilty of assisting in the maintaining
If t&e nuisance,
ifts
t\.13-7. Right of appeal in state.
|ia ail cases arising under this title the commission
L tbc state has the right of appeal as to questions

pis*.

m$

£$•134. Duties of officials and officers to
pure* this act.
|Ji) It is the duty of the governor, the commissio§3£«CO

32A-14-1

ners, the director and all officials, inspectors, and
employees of the department, all prosecuting
officials of the state and its political sul
and of counties, cities, and towns, .3
officers, sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, c o
marshals, law enforcement officials, stal
officials, and all clerks of the courts to <
enforce this title in their respective ci
Failure to do so is a class B misdemeanor.
(2) Immediately upon conviction o f an]
for violation o f this title or commission rule
violation of any city or town ordinance rd
alcoholic products, it is the duty o f the cleir
court to notify the Department of A
Beverage Control of the conviction in wn
forms supplied by the department.
32A-13-9. Authority of inspectors, peace off!
inspect.
(1) For purposes o f enforcing this title and commission rules, all members of the commission,
citizens' council, authorized representatives of the
commission or department or any law enforcement
or peace officer shall be accorded access, ingress,
and egress to and from all premises or conveyances
used in the manufacture, storage, transportation,
service, or sale of any alcoholic product. They also
have the authority to open any package containing,
or supposed to contain, any article manufactured,
sold, or exposed for sale, or held in possession with
intent to sell in violation o f this title or commission
rules, and may inspect its contents, and may take
samples of the contents for analysis.
(2) All dealers, clerks, bookkeepers, express
agents, railroad and airline officials, common and
other carriers, and their employees shall assist, when
so requested by any authorized person specified in
Subsection (1), in tracing, finding, or discovering
the presence of any article prohibited by this title or
commission rules to the extent assistance would not
infringe upon the person's federal and state constitutional
rights.
lfts

Chapter 14. Dram Shop Liability
32A-14-1. Liability for injuries resulting from illegal sale
or other distribution of alcoholic beverages • Injured
person's cause of action against intoxicated person or
persons who provided alcoholic beverage - Survival of
action.
32A-14-2. Immunity of state, state agencies and employe*
es, and political subdivision*.

32A-14-1. Liability for injuries resulting from
illegal sale or other distribution of alcoholk
beverages - Injured person's cause of action against
intoxicated person or persons who provided
alcoholic beverage • Survival of action.
(1) Any person w h o gives, sells, or otherwise
provides liquor to another contrary to this title and
by those actions causes the intoxication of the other
person, is liable for injuries in person, property* or
means of support to any third person, oir the
spouse, child, or parent of that third person,
resulting from the intoxication.
(2) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a cause o f action against the intoxicated
person and the person who provided the liquor in
violation of Subsection (1), or either of them.
(3) |f a person having rights or liabilities under
this section dies, the rights or liabilities provided by
this section survive to or against that person's
estate.
ins

For ANNOTATIONS, consult the latest UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS.
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32A-14-2. Immunity of state, state agencies and
employees, and political subdivisions.
No provision of this title creates any civil liability
on the part of the state, its agencies, employees, the
commission, the department, or any state political
subdivisions arising out of their activities in regulating, controlling, authorizing, or otherwise being
involved in the sale or other distribution of
alcoholic beverages.
IMS

Chapter 15. Bureau of Narcotics and
Alcoholic Beverage Law Enforcement
32A-15-L Creatioa of Bureau of Narcotics aad Alcohofic
Beverage Law Enforcemeat.
32A-15-2. Rttpoasibility aad jarisdictioa.
32A-1S-3. Appoiatmeat of director.
32A-15-4. Power* aad daties of director.
32A-15-5. SoppUes aad eqaipneat.
32A-15-6. Director aad officers to hare powers of peace
officers.
32A-15-7. Bureau to cooperate wita other ageades.
32A-15-S. Other ageades to cooperate with boreao.
32A-15-1. Creation of Boreao of Narcotics and
Alcoholic Beverage Law Enforcement.
There is created within the Department of Public
Safety a bureau known as the Bureau of Narcotics
and Alcoholic Beverage Law Enforcement.
ists
32A-15-2. Responsibility and jurisdiction.
The bureau shall:
(1) have specific responsibility for the enforcement of all laws of the state pertaining to alcoholic
beverages and products;
(2) have general law enforcement jurisdiction throughout the state;
(3) have concurrent law enforcement jurisdiction
with all local law enforcement agencies and their
officers. The bureau does not relieve local law enforcement agencies or officers of the responsibility of
enforcing laws relating to alcoholic beverages and
products or any other laws;
(4) sponsor or supervise programs or projects
related to prevention, detection, and control of violations of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act and
Utah Controlled Substance Act;
(5) respond to the call of the governor for
emergency or other purposes as the governor may
require.
IMS
32A-15-3. Appointment of director.
(1) The Commissioner of Public Safety shall
appoint a director who serves at the pleasure of the
commissioner, and who supervises and directs the
activities of the bureau.
(2) The director shall be a full time officer of the
state, who in addition to possessing administrative
ability, is experienced in law enforcement and has a
background of training related to narcotics and
alcoholic beverages and products.
(3) The salary of the director is fixed by the Legislature in accordance with Section 67-8-3. The
director shall also be paid all necessary expenses
incurred while engaged in the performance of
official duties.
isas
32A-15-4. Powers and dalles of director.
The director, with the consent of the Commissioner of Public Safety, shall:
(1) Appoint enforcement agents, investigative
agents, clerks, and other employees as authorized
from eligible lists supplied by the state merit system.
Not fewer than 21 enforcement and investigative
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agents shall be appointed. This provision shall not
prohibit the director from employing or paying for
the assistance of persons on a temporary basis who
may otherwise be ineligible for state employment
for purposes of assisting in crime prevention or detection;
(2) Delegate responsibilities among employees as
necessary for the purpose of policing and enforcing
the laws of this state with respect to alcoholic beverages, products, dangerous drugs, and narcotics;
(3) Establish ranks, grades, and positions in the
bureau and designate the authority and responsibility in each rank, grade, and position;
(4) Establish standards and qualifications and fix
prerequisites of training, education, and experience
for each rank, grade, and position, and fix salaries
for each rank, grade, and position in accordance
with salary standards adopted by the Division of
Finance;
(5) Appoint, under Subsection (1), personnel to
each rank, grade, and position as necessary for the
efficient operation and administration of the bureau
and devise and administer examinations designed to
test applicants for the positions. Any persons hired
shall meet prescribed standards and prerequisites;
(6) Formulate any necessary rules governing the
bureau;
(7) Discharge, demote, temporarily suspend, or
take other disciplinary action against any employes
in accordance with the State Personnel Management
Act, Chapter 19, Title 67;
(8) Prescribe any uniforms worn and equipment
used by the employees;
H
(9) Establish with the approval of the Division of
Finance, the terms and conditions under which eny*j
expense allowance is paid to any employee;
J
(10) Conduct in conjunction with the state boaira
of education and higher education in state school*,*!
colleges, and universities, an educational progrta]
concerning alcoholic products, and work in conju&J
ction with civic organizations, churches, local unM
of government, and other organizations in the praJ
vention of alcoholic product and drug violations; • 4
(11) Coordinate law enforcement programs thmJ
ughout the state and accumulate and dissemissiJ
information related to the prevention, detecnoji
and control of violations of this title as it relates | 3
storage or consumption of alcoholic beverages j |
premises maintained by social dubs,
athletic, and kindred associations;
(12) Prepare and present evidence in
with prosecution of persons charged with
offenses, and assist local law enforcement
in controlling law violations;
(13) Cooperate with any law enforcement
for the purpose of coordinating and
records concerning prevention, detection,
control of violations of the law;
(14) Make inspections and investigations
required by the Alcoholic Beverage Control
ission and Department;
(15) Consult and cooperate with the
Council on Alcoholic Beverage Control;
(16) Perform other acts as may be necessary
appropriate concerning control,of the use
alcoholic beverages and products and drugs;
(17) Make reports to the Legislature,
governor, the Commissioner of Public Safety,
Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission and
rtment, and the Citizens' Council as msy
required or requested;
; (18) Make recommendations to the
UTAH ADVANCE BEPOKIS.
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so requested by any authorized person specified in Subsection (1), in tracing, finding, or discovering the presence of any article prohibited by this
title or commission rules to the extent assistance would not infringe upon
the person's federal and state constitutional rights.
History: C. 1953,32A-13-9, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 175, § 1.

CHAPTER 14
DRAMSHOP LIABILITY
Section
32A-14-1. Liability for injuries resulting
from illegal sale or other dietribution of alcoholic beverages - Inured person's cause
of action against intoxicated

Section
Person or persons who prollded. a}corholi? beverage —
Survival of action
OOA 1/4 0 T
32A-14-2. ^ * £ ^ * £
J j —
subdivisions

32A-14-L Liability for injuries resulting from illegal sale
or other distribution of alcoholic beverages —
Injured person's cause of action against intoxicated person or persons who provided alcoholic beverage — Survival of action.
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or
at a location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage,
to a person:
(a) who is under the age of 21 years or
(b) who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic
beverages or products or drugs or
(c) whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew or
should have known from the circumstances was under the influence of
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs or
(d) who is a known interdicted person,
and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person, is liable for
injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third person, or to
the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from the intoxication. An employer is liable for the actions of its employees in violation of
this chapter.
(2) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a cause of
action against the person who provided the liquor or other alcoholic beverage in violation of Subsection (1).
781
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(3) If a person having rights or liabilities under thi^ chapter dies, the
rights or liabilities provided by this chapter survive Ito or against that
person's estate.
(4) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person
pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter wh^ch arises after the
effective date of this subsection is limited to $100,000 and the aggregate
amount which may be awarded to all persons injured as a result of one
occurrence is limited to $300,000.
(5) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter which
arises after the effective date of this subsection shall b^ commenced within
two years after the date of the injury.
(6) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of (action or additional
recovery against the person causing the injury.
History: C. 1953,32A-14-1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 175, § 1; 1986, ch. 177, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, effective March 17, 1986, added the
language in Subsection (1) following "or otherwise provides liquor," Subsections (l)(a)
through (l)(d), the last sentence in Subsection (1), and Subsections (4) through (6); inserted "directly" in Subsection (1) near the

beginning; in Subjection (2), inserted "or
other alcoholic beverage"; and made minor
stylistic changes.
Compiler's Notes. — The phrase "effective date of this subsection," referred to in
Subsections (4) ahd (5), appears in Laws
1986, ch. 177, § ^, which became effective
March 17,1986.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — A New Perspective
— Has Utah Entered the Twentieth Century
in Tort Law?, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 495.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. Jur. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 292.
C.J.S. — 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors
§ 34; 48A C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors
§§ 428-463.
A.L.R. — Civil damage or dramshop act:
what constitutes injury to means of support
within civil damage or dramshop act, 4
A.L.R.3d 1332.
Liability, under dramshop acts, of one who
sells or furnishes liquor otherwise than in operation of regularly established liquor business, 8 A.L.R.3d 1412.
Who is, as "owner" of premises on which
intoxicating liquor is sold, liable under civil
damage or dramshop act, 18 A.L.R.3d 1323.
Criminal liability for death resulting from
unlawfully furnishing intoxicating liquor or
drugs to another, 32 A.L.R.3d 589.

Common-law r^ght of action for damage
sustained by plaiitiff in consequence of sale
or gift of intoxicating liquor or habit-forming
drug to another, 97 A.L.R.3d 528.
Criminal liability of member or agent of
private club or association, or of owner or lessor of its premises, for violation of state or
local liquor or gambling laws thereon, 98
A.L.R.3d 694.
Liability of persons furnishing intoxicating
liquor for injury to or death of consumer, outside coverage of civil damage acts, 98
A.L.R.3d 1230.
Choice of law £s to liability of liquor seller
for injuries caused by intoxicated person, 2
A.L.R.4th 952.
Tavernkeeper*s liability to patron for third
person's assault, 43 A.L.R.4th 281.
Key Numbers. — Intoxicating Liquors «=»
282, 283.
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32A-14-2. Immunity of state, state agencies and employees, and political subdivisions.
No provision of this title creates any civil liability on the part of the
state, its agencies, employees, the commission, the department, or any state
political subdivisions arising out of their activities in regulating, controlling, authorizing, or otherwise being involved in the sale or other distribution of alcoholic beverages.
History: C. 1953,32A-14-2, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 175, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Liability of state or municipality
in tort action for damages arising out of sale
of intoxicating liquor by state or municipally

operated liquor store or establishment, 95
A.L.R.3d 1243

CHAPTER 15
BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE
LAW ENFORCEMENT
Section
32A-15-1. Creation of Bureau of Narcotics
and Alcoholic Beverage Law
Enforcement
32A-15-2. Responsibility and jurisdiction.
32A-15-3. Appointment of director.
32A-15-4. Powers and duties of director.

Section
32A-15-5. Supplies and equipment.
32A-15-6. Director and officers to have
powers of peace officers.
32A-15-7. Bureau ^cooperate with other
32A-15-8. Othe/agencies to cooperate with
bureau.

32A-15-1. Creation of Bureau of Narcotics and Alcoholic
Beverage Law Enforcement.
There is created within the Department of Public Safety a bureau known
as the Bureau of Narcotics and Alcoholic Beverage Law Enforcement.
History: C. 1953,32 A-15-1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 175, § 1.

Cross-References. — Department of pubhe safety, § 41-13-1 et seq.
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indicates by any form of written expression the intention of the injured
person not to be bound by the settlement agreement, liability release, or
disavowed statement.
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 4.

78-27-36. Right of rescission or disavowal of release, settlement, or
statement by injured person in addition to other provisions.—The rights
provided by this act are intended to be in addition to, and not in lieu of,
any rights of rescission, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise existing
in the law.
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 5.

78-27-37. Comparative negligence—Diminishment of damages—"Contributory negligence" includes "assumption of the risk."—Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence or gross negligence resulting in
death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great
as the negligence or gross negligence of the person against whom recovery
is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering. As used
in this act, "contributory negligence" includes "assumption of the risk."
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 1.

releases on other joint

Title of Act.
An act relating to actions for the recovery of damages in actions based on
negligence or gross negligence; removing
contributory negligence as a bar to any
recovery under certain circumstances; providing for the diminishing of any recovery
in proportion to the negligence of the
person seeking recovery; providing for
separate judgments as to damages and
proportionate negligence; providing for
contribution among joint tort-feasors; providing for ^the release of one or more
joint tort-feasors without releasing them
all; and providing for the effect of such

tort-feasors.—L.

'
Cross-Reference.
Product Liability Act, manufacturer or
seller not liable if alteration or modification of product after sale is substantial
contributing cause of injury, 78-15-5.
Law Reviews.
Comment, McGinn v. Utah Power &
Light Co.—Jury Blindfolding in Comparative Negligence Cases, 1975 Utah L. Rev.
569.
Note, A Primer on Damages under the
Utah Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes, 1974 Utah L. Kev. 519.

78-27-38. Separate special verdicts on damages and percentage of negligence—Reduction of damages.—The court may, and when requested by
any party shall, direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining
(1) the total amount of damages suffered and (2) the percentage of negligence attributable to each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount
of the damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to
the person seeking recovery.
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 2 .

78-27-39. Contribution among joint tort-feasors—Discharge of common
liability by joint tort-feasor required.—(1) The right of contribution shall
exist among joint tort-feasors, but a joint tort-feasor shall not be entitled
348
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Sundays and
Holiday § 70 et seq.
C.J.S. — 40 C.J.S. Holidays §§ 4 to 6.
A.L.R. — Service of summons or complaint

on Sunday or holiday, validity of, 63 A.L.R.3d
423.
Key Numbers. — Holidays «=» 4 to 6.

68-3-9- Seal, how affixed.
When the seal of a court or public officer is required by law to be affixed to
any paper, the word "seal" includes an impression of such seal upon the paper
alone, as well as upon wax or a wafer affixed thereto. In all other cases the
word "seal" may include a scroll printed or written.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2495;
C.L. 1917, § 5845; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-9.
Cross-References. — Custody of seals by
archivist, § 63-2 to 62.5.

Great seal of the State of Utah, Utah Const.,
Art. VII, Sec. 20; § 67-la-8.
Municipal seals, § 10-1-202.
Seals of courts, §§ 78-7-14, 78-7-15.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 68 Am. Jur. 2d Seals § 3.
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Seals § 3.
Key Numbers. — Seals «=» 3.

68-3-10. Joint authority is authority to majority.
Words giving a joint authority to three or more public officers, or other
persons, are to be construed as giving such authority to a majority of them,
unless it is otherwise expressed in the act giving the authority.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2496;
C.L. 1917, § 5846; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-10.

Cross-References. — Personal representatives, majority concurrence required unless
will provides otherwise, § 75-3-716.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Board of education.
Joint authority is not "otherwise expressed"
in any statute prescribing the powers and du-

ties of a board of education. Tooele Bldg. Ass'n
v. Tooele High School Dist. No. 1,43 Utah 362,
134 P. 894 (1913).

68-3-11. Rules of construction as to words and phrases.
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the
approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such
others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are
defined by statute, are to be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2497;
C.L. 1917, § 5847; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-11.

Cross-References. — Duty of court to construe statutes, § 78-21-3.
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT

63-30-8

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Construction and application.
The waiver of immunity from suit "for the
recovery of any property real or personal or for
the possession thereof does not include an action for damages for impairment of access to
property caused by construction of highway

underpass; this act should lie strictly construed
to preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it
only as clearly expressed therein. Holt v. Utah
State Rd. Comm., 30 Utah|2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286
(1973).

63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent operation of motor vehicles — Exception.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a motoit vehicle or other
equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority; provided, however, that t(his section shall
not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined l^y law and while
being driven in accordance with the requirements of § 41-6-14.
History: L, 1965, ch. 139, § 7; 1983, ch.
129, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amendment substituted "during the performance of
his duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority" for "while in the
scope of his employment"; and deleted "Utah

Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter
86, Laws of Utah, 1961" at the end of the section.
Cross-References. — [Safety Responsibility
Act, provisions of motor vjehicle liability policy,
§ 41-12-21.

63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways,
bridges, or other structures.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waited for any injury
caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of ajiy highway, road,
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge^ viaduct or other
structure located thereon.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 8.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Complaint, sufficiency of allegations.
Construction.
Contributory negligence.
Dangerous objects.
Discretionary function.
Ice and snow on sidewalk.
Manholes.
Negligent construction.
New duties not created.
Nondelegable duty.
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

78-27-42

to a money judgment for contribution until he has, by payment, discharged
the common liability or more than his prorata share thereof.
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 3.
Compiler's Notes.
Section 3 of Laws 1973, ch. 209 contamed no subsec. (2).
Cross-References.
Enforcement of contribution and reimbursement, Rules of Civil Procedure, Bule
69 h
i }'
.-,. .
„,
Joint obligations, 15-4-1 et seq.

ApplicabiUty.
Because this section creates a new cause
of action in a tort-feasor who has paid
m o r e t h a n h j g pr0 rata share of a common
liability, it is not merely remedial and
does not
*?& ^ h f e t}?? underlying tort
was committed before its effective date,
e v e n though liability was not adjudged
u n t i l a f t e r t h a t date% Brunyer v. Salt
L
ake County, 551 P. 2d 521.

78-27-40. Settlement by joint tort-feasor—Determination of relative degrees of fault of joint tort-feasors—"Joint tort-feasor" defined.—(1) A
joint tort-feasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person shall
not be entitled to recover contribution from another joint tort-feasor whose
liability to the injured person is not extinguished by that settlement.
(2) When there is a disproportion of fault among joint tort-feasors to
an extent that it would render inequitable an equal distribution by contribution among them of their common liability, the relative degrees of fault of
the joint tort-feasors shall be considered in determining their prorata
shares, solely for the purpose of determining their rights of contribution
among themselves, each remaining severally liable to the injured person for
the whole injury as at common law.
(3) As used in this section, "joint tort-feasor" means one of two or
more persons, jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to
person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against
all or some of them.
History: L. 1973, eh. 209, § 4.

78-27-41. Individual liability of joint tort-feasors, right of indemnity
under law, and contractual right to contribution or indemnity not affected.
—Nothing in this act shall affect:
(1) The common-law liability of the several joint tort-feasors to have
judgment recovered, and payment made, from them individually by the
injured person for the whole injury. However, the recovery of a judgment
by the injured person against one joint tort-feasor does not discharge the
other joint tort-feasors.
(2) Any right of indemnity which may exist under present law.
(3) Any right to contribution or indemnity arising from contract or
agreement.
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 5.

78-27-42. Release of joint tort-feasor—Reduction of injured person's
claim.—A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether
before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors, unless
the release so provides, but reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors
by the greater of: (1) The amount of the consideration paid for that re349
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STATE OF UTAH

MARJORIE ALLISEN,
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AMERICAN LEGION POST NO.
134,

AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY D. FENN
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AMERICAN LEGION POST NO.
134,

Civil No. 38319
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vs.
STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, et al.,
Third-Party Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: SS.
County of Salt Lake)
JERRY D. FENN, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

1.

In 1985 I was the Chairman of the Citizens1 Council

on Alcoholic Beverage Control, a seven member, bi-partisan
council created by statutes of the State of Utah and independently
empowered to consider, investigate and inquire into all matters
related to the liquor laws of the state.

See §32A-l-32 Utah Code

Ann. (1985).
2.

The scope of the Citizens1 Council's responsibilities

encompasses serving in an advisory capacity to the Utah Legislature regarding possible amendments to the liquor laws.

In the

sximmer of 1985, the Business, Labor & Economic Development Interim
Committee of the Legislature referred several proposed liquor law
amendments to the Citizens' Council.
3. On November 20, 1985, the Citizens' Council submitted
its report and recommendation to this committee of the Utah
Legislature. A true and accurate copy of the Report and Recommendation is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
4.

The Report and Recommendation proposed certain amend-

ments to the then existing Utah Dram Shop Act.

Because the Dram

Shop Act that then existed created liability only for those giving,
selling or otherwise providing "Liquor", one of the proposed
amendments, found at pages 8 and 9 of the Report, was to expand
the scope of the statute to encompass "beer".
5. After the Report and Recommendation was submitted to
the Legislature, I was asked by the Chairperson of the Interim
Committee to draft the proposed revisions to the Utah Dram Shop
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Act.

Among other things, the proposed amendments as originally

drafted would have expanded the scope of the pram Shop Act to
any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides
"alcoholic beverages," which would have included both liquor
and beer. The proposed amendment incorporated the revisions
recommended by the Citizens' Council.
6.

The amendments as originally drafted did not pass.

This was due in part I believe to lobbying efforts on the part
of the Utah Grocers' Association and others who vigorously opposed
any expansion of statutory liability to those who sold alcoholic
beverages for off-premise consumption.

The Act as passed provides

only for liability for any person who directly "gives, sells, or
otherwise provides liquor, or at a location allowing consumption
on the premises, any alcoholic beverage . . . "

The reason for this

amendment was to exclude from the scope of the dram shop statute
liability grocery stores, convenience stores and other establishments which sell beer but do not allow consumption on premises.
In other words, despite the Report and Recommendation of the
Citizens' Council to the Utah Legislature to expand the scope of
the Dram Shop Statute to include all alcoholic beverages, both
liquor and beer, the Legislature specifically rejected the recommendation to the extent that the Utah Dram Shop Act, in its present
form, does not apply to the sale of beer at locations that do not
allow consumption on the premises.
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Further a f f i a n t sayeth not.
DATED t h i s t > '

day of September, 1987.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o before v me t h i s ^ y ^ a a y of September,
1987.

NOTARY P U B L I C /
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:
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EXHIBIT "A"

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Q£
THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL
TO THE

PTAB IBGjSiATUgg

SUBMITTED
NOVEMBER 20, 1983
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I. INTRODUCTION
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A. The Qtizens' Council Opposes the Elimination of Sute Control
Over the Number of Liquor Outlets
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B. The Qtizens' Council Opposes an Increase in the Hours When
Liquor May be Sold in Restaurants
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C Further Consideration of a Proposal Allowing the Server to
Bring Liquor in Unopened Bottles to the Restaurant Patron's
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E. Further Study of a Proposal to Allow the Use of a Metered
Liquor Dispensing Device in Private Qubs

14

F. The Qtizens' Council Supports a Law that would Provide for
a One Year Driver's License Denial for Minors Convicted of
any Crime Involving the Possession, Use or Abuse of
Alcohol or Controlled Substances

17

C. The Qtizens' Council Favors Clear Labeling of Alcoholic
Beverages Which Reasonably Apprises the Public that
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19

H. The Qtizens' Council Opposes an Amendment to Prohibit
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20

III. CONCLUSION

22

MPOBT AND ISCOlimaroATION OF

TIE CITIZENS' CPWCIL OK ALC0BQUC BBVEKACE CQNTKOl
TO TIE PTAB IBqiSUTVKE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Citizens' Council on Alcoholic Beverage Control (the"Citizens'
Council"), a seven member, bi-partisan council created by statutes of the
State of Utah, is independently empowered to consider, investigate and
inquire into all matters related to the liquor lavs of the state. §& S32A-122 Utah Code Ann. (1985). The scope of the Citizens' Council's responsibilities
encompasses serving in an advisory capacity to the Legislature regarding
possible amendments to the state's liquor lavs.
During the summer of 1985, the Business, Labor and Economic
Development Interim Committee of the Legislature referred several
proposed amendments to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (the "Act") to
the Citizens' Council for comment The Citizens' Council held three public
hearings in September and October, 1985 to obuin comment about these and
other proposed amendments.
Although the Citizens' Council heard comments from numerous people,
it should be pointed out that most of those who addressed the Council were
representatives of the travel and tourism or hospitality industries. Very few
citizens vho were not directly involved with alcoholic beverages appeared
before the Council The comments which the Citizens' Council heard from
special interest groups may not in fact be representative of the sentiments of
a majority of the citizens of the state. The Citizens' Council believes that
more public comment should be elicited in an effort to more clearly ascertain
public opinion with regard to two of the proposed amendments.
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Ambivalence about alcohol characterized the attitude of many who
testified before the Citizens' Council. On the one hand, the Citizens' Council
heard almost unanimous condemnation of the abuse of alcohoL On the other
hand, the Council heard a substantial number of comments that Utah's
liquor laws are too tough and need to be more accommodating to tourists
and those who wish to drink. The Council hearings produced an interesting
dichotomy: condemnation of the evils of alcohol while at the same time a
chorus of voices crying out for liberalization of the law.
The statutory policy of the state with respect to alcoholic beverages is
to neither promote nor encourage their sale or consumption but to "regulate
the sale of alcoholic beverages in a manner and at prices which reasonably
satisfy the public demand and protect the public interest, including the
rights of citizens who do not wish to be involved with alcoholic products."
f 32A-1 -4(3) Utah & & AM. (1985). Of course, this is no easy task. It
represents a difficult balancing of differing interests.
In formulating recommendations on proposed amendments, the
Gtizens' Council has attempted to balance the public demand for alcoholic
beverages with protecting the public interest. The Council has subscribed to
a philisophical approach that any proposed change in the Act that leads to
increased abuse of alcohol should be defeated. Alcohol is the number one
drug of abuse in our society. Highway accidents, death, sickness, social
disruption, and economic loss result from excess alcohol consumption. In
reaching a recommendation on any proposed amendment, the Gtizens'
Council has examined whether the amendment may lead to an increase in
the consumption of alcohol. If it appears that alcohol consumption will not
increase as a result of the amendment, the Council has inquired whether the
current statutory provision adequately meets public demand for alcoholic
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beverages while protecting the public interest or whether substantial
reasons for amending the Act exist
The Qtizens' Council submits the following report and
recommendation on the proposed amendments and enactments it has
considered.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS
A THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL OPPOSES THE ELIMINATION OP STATE
CONTROL OYER THE NUMBER OP LIQUOR OUTLETS
With the repeal of Prohibition (the 18th Amendment) in 1933, Utah
was one of 18 states to adopt the "state control" concept of dispensing liquor.
This system vests control of the sale of liquor with the state government
rather than private enterprise. Utah has the lowest per-capita consumption
of alcohol of any state. Of course, this is partly attributable to the large nondrinking population. However, average annual consumption of alcohol in the
18 control states is approximately 1.63 gallons per capita whereas average
annual consumption in the 32 other states is 2.10 gallons. An argument can
be made that state control over the price and availability of alcoholic
beverages appears to make a difference in consumption of alcohol. The
Qtizens' Council is of the opinion that it is contary to the public interest to
see Utah's low rate of alcohol consumption increase.
The Qtizens' Council believes the state, rather than local
authorities, is the appropriate entity to regulate the number of outlets where
liquor may be purchased. Elimination of the statutory quotas in favor of
local control could lead to an unfettered proliferation in the number of
outlets. It is possible that some municipalities would completely abandon
all restraints on the number of liquor outlets. On the other hand, it is also
possible that some municipalities may totally prohibit outlets within their
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jurisdiction. The Citizens' Council is persuaded that elimination of the
statutory quotas in favor of local control would be contrary to the public
interest because of the possible large increase in availability of alcoholic
beverages and increased alcohol consumption and abuse which could follow.
In addition, the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control and the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission have demonstrated expertise in
performing the difficult balancing task required in regulating liquor
availability through controlling the number of outlets. It is the consensus of
the Citizens' Council that such expertise not be wasted nor the regulatory
purview of the Department and the Commission diminished.
Finally, the 1985 Act, which became effective on July 1,1985.
provided for an increased rate of growth in the number of liquor outlets.
The statutory quotas were revised to allow for a slightly greater rate of
growth for package agencies and restaurant liquor outlets and the statutory
ceiling on private club outlets was abolished. The new quotas, along with
improved regulatory control which may result in revocation of unqualified
and non-complying outlets' licenses, could ameliorate somewhat the scarcity
of licenses.

In the future, the Legislature may deem it advisable to

examine the liquor license allocation system further. However, the Citizens'
Council is of the opinion that total elimination of the quotas in favor of local
regulation of the number of outlets is neither wise nor warranted.
B. THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL OPPOSES AW TNCTEASS Itt THE HOOTS

WHEN 1.10TT0K MAT BE SOLD IN RBTAWANTS
Liquor can be sold in restaurants under the Act from 4:00 p.m. until
midnight The Utah Restaurant Association has proposed that the hours of
permissible liquor sales in restaurants be extended to 10:00 i.m. to 1:00 a.m.
These proposed hours match the liquor sales hours in private clubs.
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In determining whether to recommend an extension or the hours of
restaurant liquor sales, the Qtizens' Council considered whether public
demand for increased hours exists or whether the demands of the liquorconsuming populace are currently being met at the lunch hour. The Council
then analyzed whether an increase in liquor sales hour* would have
beneficial or deleterious impacts on the public interest
It appears that the demands of those who desire to consume liquor at
the lunch hour are being met by existing law. The Qtizens' Council has not
observed a groundsweil of public support for the proposal to extend hours of
liquor sales in restaurants. While the restaurant industry understandably
believes the ability to sell liquor at lunch time may attract more customers
to their establishments, the Council does not think the demonstrated
demand for liquor during lunch in restaurants is significant enough to justify
the extension of hours, particularly given the negative impacts discussed
below.
The Citizens' Council is persuaded that the advantages which a
restaurant may gain by being allowed to serve liquor at the lunch hour
would be offset by the unfavorable aspects to the general public by such a
change. Increasing the hours of liquor sales in restaurants would increase
the availability of liquor in public places. Where the needs of those who
wish to consume liquor at lunch are apparently being met by private clubs,
the public interest, on balance, appears to weigh in favor of not increasing
availability. A substantial segment of the population may not wish to be
exposed to liquor sales at the lunch hour. Moreover, the increase in
availability of liquor early in the day may lead to more alcohol abuse and
loss to society. The incidents of on-the-job intoxication may increase,
bringing the specter of diminished productivity and economic loss.
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Although the extent of possible negative impacts cannot be accurately
predicted, the risk of increased alcohol abuse cannot be totally discounted.
Therefore, given the lack of strong public demand for the extension of liquor
sales hours, coupled with the potential for abuse occasioned by increased
availability of liquor, the Gtizens' Council recommends the Legislature not
amend the law to increase the hours of liquor sales in restaurants from the
current 4:00 p.m. to midnight.
f! FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF A PROPOSAL ALLOTING THE
SERVER TO BRING LIQUOR IN UNOPENED BOTTLES TO THIS
RESTAURANT PATRON'S TABLE
Current lav provides that a restaurant patron must make his or her
liquor purchases at an approved location in the restaurant and then bring
the mini-bottle back to the table. The Utah Restaurant Association and
others in the hospitality industry have proposed the Act be amended to
allow the server to bring the unopened mini-bottle directly to the patrons
table.
The Gtizens' Council has concluded that further analysis of this
proposed amendment is warranted. This proposal should be analyzed in
conjunction with an in-depth consideration of education and training of
restaurant servers. In addition, the Council believes further public hearings
would be helpful in understanding and explaining the ramifications of this
proposed amendment and in ascertaining public opinion. Opponents of this
amendment argue that allowing the server to bring liquor to the table may
result in the restaurant encouraging and promoting liquor sales and that
allowing untrained servers to bring the liquor to the table may result in the
loss of control over service of liquor to minors and intoxicated persons.
Opponents of this amendment also argue that restaurant employees who
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may not wish to handle liquor will be required by their employer to serve
liquor. Furthermore, a question has been raised whether the current
system deters a customer who has consumed his or her first mini-bottle
from buying a second or third mini-bottle.
On the other hand, proponents of the amendment have argued that
the change will promote tourism, further accommodate patrons and alleviate
the perception of many that Utah's liquor laws are an anomaly. Proponents
also argue that control over dispensing liquor will actually increase as the
point of distribution is shifted to the patron's table since this facilitates the
server's perusal of possible consumers of liquor.
The Gtizens' Council has also been apprised that adoption of this
proposal may impact on liquor advertising laws. The ramifications of this
amendment on liquor advertising laws should be analyzed. The issue of
"brownbagging" of liquor in restaurants may also be considered in
conjunction with this proposal.
Finally, even though this provision of the state's liquor law is
different from other states, the Gtizens' Council is not convinced, at this
point, that this is necessarily negative. Although the Council heard
testimony from representatives of the tourism and hospitality industries
claiming the majority of citizens find the current law an embarrassment and
unnecessarily inconvenient to tourists, the Gtizens' Council is of the opinion
that further analysis is necessary to determine if the purported public
sentiment to amend the law in fact exists. The existing procedures of liquor
purchases in restaurants may in fact be a workable system supported by a
majority of the citizens of the sute. However, it must be pointed out that in
the three public hearings held by the Council, it did not hear substantial
opposition to this proposed change. At this point the Council is not sure
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whether that is because significant public opposition does not exist or
because the issue has not adequately been brought to the publics attention.
The Citizens' Council believes a greater effort must be made to elicit public
comment and ascertain public opinion regarding this proposed amendment
and the advantages and disadvantages of the amendment weighed further
during the next year so that a recommendation on this issue can be made
prior to the 1987 legislative general session.
D

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAM SHOP STATUTE
Dram shop statutes and common law liability for dram shops are

relatively recent developments in the area of tort law. Prior to the
temperance movement of the early nineteenth century, a tavern owner
generally could not be liable for any damages caused by a drunic to a third
party. However, this principle has given way to common law liability in 22
states and statutory dram shop liability in 23 states, including Utah. Chapter
14 of the Act, captioned Dram Shop Liability provides in part:
(1) Any person who gives, sells, or otherwise provides
liquor to another contrary to this title and by those
actions causes the intoxication of the other person, is
liable for injuries in person, property, or means of support
to any third person, or the spouse, child, or parent of
that third person, resulting from intoxication.
(2) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1)
has a cause of action against the intoxicated person and the
person who provided the liquor in violation of Subsection (1),
or either of them.
(3) If a person having rights or liabilities under this section
dies, the rights or liabilities provided by this section survive
to or against that person's estate.
S32A-14-1 UlahCfidfe. Aim (1983).
The dram shop statute (the "Statute") presently creates liability only
for those giving, selling or otherwise providing "liquor." The Statute does not

encompass beer. By limiting the Statute to "liquor", only a small percentage
of those who furnish alcoholic beverages are subjected to liability.
Intoxication stemming from the consumption of beer is clearly a significant
issue facing society. The incidents of beer-induced intoxication are not
minimal. The Council is of the opinion that those who sell give or otherwise
provide beer to others should not escape the consequences for their actions
in circumstances where those who furnish liquor would be liable. The
Gtizens' Council recommends an amendment to the Statute to encompass all
"alcoholic beverages." (6 voted in favor of this amendment with Mr.
Thurman opposed).
The Statute should be further amended to clearly delineate liability
triggering acts. The Statute currently imposes liability on those who furnish
liquor "contrary to this title." This rather nebulous phrase should be deleted
and the particular liability triggering acts inserted. Specifically, at least
three acts should be inserted in the Statute as acts which trigger liability:
Selling, giving or otherwise providing alcoholic beverages, unless otherwise
permitted by law, to (1) minors, S32A-12-8; (2) any person apparently
under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs,
S32A-12-9; and (3) any known interdicted person. S32A-12-10 Utah Code
AM. (1985).
The Act presently makes it a criminal offense for a person to sell or
otherwise furnish any alcoholic beverage to a person "actually or apparently
under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs."
S32A-12-9 Ulah teds. AM- (1985). The Gtizens' Council believes the
Legislature should consider deleting the words "actually or" from the statute.
It has been argued that the current provision imposes a very harsh standard
for which there is no defense and that instead, a person should be liable

under the Dram Shop Statute or under the criminal provisions of the Act
only if the person furnishes alcoholic beverages to an individual who is
"apparently intoxicated." For example, a private club proprietor will now be
subject to dram shop or criminal liability if he sells an individual liquor who
has a blood-alcohol concentration of .OS or higher, even though the
individual has no outward appearance of intoxication and the person selling
the beverage has no reason to suspect the individual is intoxicated.
The Citizens' Council also recommends the Legislature consider
imposing a ceiling on the amount of damages that can be recovered under
the Statute. Presently there is no dollar limit on damages recoverable under
the Statute. The Council heard testimony that many establishments are
foregoing insurance coverage for dram shop liability because of extremely
expensive insurance premiums. Insurance companies are reluctant to write
dram shop insurance due to the unlimited potential liability and the risk of
numerous judgments. At least four states currently place limits on the
amount that can be recovered against the person furnishing the alcoholic
beverage, ranging from $30,000 in Illinois to $500,000 in North Carolina.
The Gtizens' Council recommends a limitation on the amount of damages that
may be awarded to any person be incorporated into the Statute with an
aggregate that may be awarded to all persons as a result of a single
occurrence. Further input may be needed from the insurance industry and
others to determine the dollar amount of the limitation. However, the
Gtizens* Council is persuaded that a limitation of $100,000 that may be
awarded to any person with an aggregate of $300,000 that may be awarded
as a result of a single occurrence is an appropriate ceiling. The Council heard
testimony that such a limitation could have a measurable impact on
increasing the availability of dram shop insurance to an establishment The
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Gtizens' Council believes it is in the public interest that commercial vendors
of alcoholic beverages have dram shop insurance coverage to provide a
source of payment for injuries to third persons caused by an intoxicated
person. A limitation on the amount of damages that can be recovered in
any specific instance may reduce somewhat the reluctance of insurance
carriers to provide such insurance and could have the tendency to prevent
premiums for such insurance from continuing to increase at the present
rapid rates. If a limitation on the amount of damages results in more
establishments obtaining dram shop insurance, the disadvantages of limiting
an individual's recovery are offset by the increased likelihood that a fund
will be available from which the victim can recover. Given the current
open-ended liability, some victims may obtain judgments but may not be
able to recover their damages from the establishment if the establishment is
without insurance. Furthermore, it should be remembered that dram shop
liability is secondary liability. The victim is not limited by statute in the
amount of damages he or she can recover from the primary tortfeasor.
In addition, the Council believes that a specific statute of limitations
should be provided in the Statute. The Council recommends an amendment
to the Statute to require that any action under the Statute be brought within
one year of the date of the occurrence. Often a potentially liable
establishment may not be apprised of the cause of action until long after the
injury occurs. The general statute of limitations applicable to personal
injury cases imposes a hardship on the establishment that served the
alcoholic beverage since, if a long time has elapsed after the person causing
the injury was allegedly furnished alcohol, evidentiary problems are
compounded in finding someone who can testify whether the establishment

served the person alcoholic beverages and, if so, whether the person
appeared to be intoxicated.
The Legislature should consider amending the law to require
mandatory education and training of all establishment employees who are
directly involved in selling or otherwise furnishing alcoholic beverages. The
Qtizens' Council recommends the Legislature consider establishing an
Alcohol Training and Education Advisory Committee consisting of persons
representing the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, the Citizens'
Council, the Attorney General the Department of Public Safety, the Division
of Alcoholism and Drugs, and other appropriate governmental entities as
well as representatives of alcoholic beverage retailers. The Advisory
Committee would assist in the formation and implementation of a training
and education curriculum. An Alcohol Training and Education Seminar
should be required for all individuals who sell or furnish alcoholic beverages
to the public in the scope of their employment The following subjects
should be included in the curriculum and instruction: (1) Alcohol as a drug
and its effect on the body and behavior, especially driving ability; (2)
Recognizing the problem drinker; (3) State alcoholic beverage laws including
operational restrictions; (4) The dram shop law; (5) Drunk driving laws; (6)
Dealing with the problem customer, including ways to cut off service, ways
to deal with the belligerent customer and alternative means of
transportation to get the customer safety home; and (7) Temporary detention
of the criminal violator of liquor laws until law enforcement officers arrive.
The Retail Grocers Association informed the Qtizens' Council of two
amendments they intend to propose: (1) an amendment to provide that a
merchant may temporarily take an indivdual into custody and detain the
person if he or she attempts to make an unlawful purchase of an alcoholic

beverage and (2) an amendment making it a crime for a person actually
intoxicated or an interdicted person to purchase an alcoholic beverage. The
Qtizens' Council endorses these amendments vhich will be introduced in the
1986 general legislative session. The Retail Grocers Association also
proposes that individuals under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages
be issued drivers' licenses which clearly indicate the individual is under age
21. It was suggested that the drivers' licenses of those under the age of 21
should differ in appearance from licenses of those over age 21, e.g.. perhaps
by color or by profile photograph rather than a front view photograph. The
Qtizens' Council believes that contrasting drivers' licenses for those over and
under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages will assist retailers of
alcoholic beverages in avoiding sales to those under the age of 21.
Finally, the Qtizens' Council is of the opinion that the State of Utah
should not be immune from liability for the sale of alcoholic beverages out
of a state liquor store to a minor, to an apparently intoxicated person or to a
known interdicted person. If the Legislature adopts the clarifying and
limiting amendments to identify the wrongful acts that trigger liability, to
impose a limitation on the amount of damages that can be recovered and to
establish a one year statute of limitations, the Council is of the opinion that,
vith these additional safeguards, the state should not be immune from
liability under the Statute. Hovever, the Act should clearly indicate that
immunity is vaived only for sales by the state out of state liquor stores.
The state should not be liable for sales by a package agency or sales by any
other licensee or permittee.

E. FURTHER STUPT OF A PROPOSAL TO ALLOW THE USE P E A
METERED LIOUOE DISPENSING DEVICE \H P1IVATE CLUBS
The Licensed Club Association has proposed that the use of minibottles in private clubs be eliminated in favor of a metered liquor dispensing
device. Whereas the mini-bottle contains 1.7 ounces of liquor, the metered
device would be calibrated to dispense one ounce of liquor. The proposal to
use a metered device has facial appeal. However, before the Citizens"
Council can make a definitive recommendation with regard to the metered
device, several questions must be answered:
First, will the use of a metered device actually cut consumption of
liquor significantly? Opponents have argued that consumers of alcohol may
increase the number of drinks they order to offset, in part, the reduction in
liquor in a given drink, thus leading to an increase in the profits made by
private clubs. On the other hand, certainly the amount of liquor in a given
drink would be reduced. However, it is not clear to the Citizens' Council that
this would lead to a significant reduction in the consumption of liquor if the
argument has merit that the number of drinks ordered on average would
increase.

The question of whether private club patrons drink a given

number of drinks or drink to consume a desired amount of alcohol has not
been definitively answered in the Council's hearings. The issue of reduced
consumption has not been studied in depth nor any statistical evidence
offered to support a conclusion of a significant reduction in liquor
consumption. It should be pointed out that a persuasive common sense
argument has been made that people who drink socially in a private club
usually consume a finite number of drinks per hour and that this behavior
will not be significantly altered if a metered device is used.
The Citizens' Council believes its recommendation should take into

, d device on co»»»P U o n

or UQUOC of leta w

^^

i y p € 8 ot

UQUO

^
»»» «•
^ o, unci.
^eeuv oc * * - » B d e v i w to pr»«e d»
^ . w m t h e u - ^
e l U 0 W e d

w d tt

W

,

^

-•rrrd^^-^r^-H o*ev.f.ft*

»

m e bir «nd«

«»

brings the drink to the table. The use of this device will not change the
procedures of private club liquor distribution in any significant way.
Opponents claim the real risk of this amendment is that the switch to a
metered device in private clubs may lead to a clamor by restaurant
proprietors that they should be allowed to use a metered device as well. Of
course if a metered device was used in restaurants, for all practical purposes,
the state would have liquor-by-the-drink. a concept rejected by the voters,
since it would be infeasible to use a metered device and not have the
bartender mil the drinks. The probable outcry for the use of a metered
device in restaurants then is the most significant risk opponents foresee in
allowing the metered device in private clubs.
The Gtizens' Council feels that these issues should be examined
further during the next year. The metered device proposal, if adopted,
would represent a major change in the State's liquor laws. Before such a
change is recommended, all of the ramifications of such a proposal should be
examined and fully articulated.

Al: -ugh this issue has surfaced several

times over the years, it has been considered in only three hearings over a
period of two months by the reorganized Citizens' Council. The Council is of
the opinion that further public hearings and data on the use of the metered
device and its impact on consumption and increased revenues would be
helpful in further illuminating the issues and providing data on which a
decision can be based. Over the next year, the Gtizens' Council intends to
consider more fully the advantages and disadvantages of the metered device
and intends to submit a report and recommendation on the metered device
to the Legislature after its analysis has been completed.

F THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL SUPPORTS A LAW THAT WOULD
PROVIDE FOR A ONE TEA* DRIVER'S LICENSE DENIAL FOB MINORS
CONVICTED OF ANT CRIME INVOLVING THE POSSESSION. USE OB
ABUSE OF ALCOHOL OR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

It is self-evident that alcohol use by minors is a significant societal
problem. The Citizens' Council believes it is in the public interest to impose
stringent sanctions on minors who are convicted of offenses involving the
possession, use or abuse of alcohol or controlled substances. One of the most
eagerly awaited and sought after privileges of teenagers is the privilege to
drive. Utah grants this privilege to teenagers at the age of 16. The risk of
loss of this privilege constitutes a deterrent to the use of alcohol by teens.
Under Utah lav. a person must be 21 to purchase, possess or consume
alcoholic beverages. This law represents a recognition that society should
not encourage, and in fact, should prohibit the consumption of alcohol by
minors.

A law which would deny driving privileges to minors convicted of

alcohol offenses is further recognition of society's desire to discourage
teenage drinking. Furthermore, revocation of driving privileges to minors
who drink advances public safety, as those who have a propensity to drink
and then possibly drive are removed from the highways.
The Citizens' Council recommends the enactment of a law providing
that whenever a person 17 years of age or younger, is convicted of any
offense or determined by a juvenile court to have committed any offense
involving the possession, use or abuse of alcohol or controlled substances, the
court in which the person is convicted shall prepare and send to the Office of
Driver License Services, an order of denial of driving privileges for the
person so convicted. The Act should also contain a provision that the court
issuing such denial may, upon petition, review the order and may withdraw

it However, the court should not be able to withdraw the order for a period
of 90 days following issuance, if it is the first such order issued with
respect to the person, or for one year if it is the second or subsequent such
order issued. The Act should provide that upon receipt of the first order
denying driving privileges, the Office of Driver License Services shall impose
a suspension of driving privileges for one year, or until the person so
suspended reaches 17. whichever is longer. Upon receipt of a second order
denying driving privileges, the Office of Driver License Services shall
suspend driving privileges for one year or until the person reaches 18 years
of age. whichever is longer. This proposal is modeled after Oregon's Driver's
License Denial law. [ See. H J. No. 44, Suspension of Juvenile Driving
Privileges, filed by Representative Kim R. Burningham on October 16,1985
which is very similar to the Oregon law.)
In Oregon, where such a law has been in effect since 1983. there has
been a significant reduction in juveniles arrested for various alcohol-related
offenses. The following data has been provided by the Oregon Traffic Safety
Commission:
Juveniles, Arrested

* Change 1982-1984

DM
Open Container
All Liquor Law Violations
All Drug Law Violations

- 17X (DUI arrests *2% overall)
-45 X
-12 %
-22%

Of course, factors other than the driver's license denial law may explain, in
part, the significant reductions in alcohol-related juvenile arrests but the
stiff driver's license sanctions have most certainly contributed.
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G THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL FAVORS CLEAR LABELING OF
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES WHICH REASONABLY APPRISES THE

PUBLIC THAT THE BEVEIAGE CONTAINS ALCQSQL
The Qtizens' Council recently became aware that beverages
containing alcohol, i.e. "malt beverage coolers", which bore no indication that
they contained alcohol were being sold in the state. The labels on these
beverages merely stated "a malt beverage." In some grocery and
convenience stores these beverages were found in the fsoda pop coolers.
When the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control discovered these
beverages were being sold in the state, it asked the distributors of these
malt beverages to place a label on all such beverages indicating the beverage
was an "alcoholic beverage". The distributors voluntarily complied vith the
Department's request to label the beverages.
While commending distributors of malt beverage coolers who have
voluntarily labeled such beverages as alcoholic, the consensus of the Qtizens'
Council is that state law should require such labeling. The Qtizens' Council is
of the opinion that all beverages falling within the definition of alcoholic
beverages as defined in S32A-1-5(1), (4) and (17) iluhCodi AM. (1985)
should clearly indicate they are alcoholic beverages. However, since liquor
and beer are already sufficiently identified, the Qtizens' Council is
particularly concerned that beer coolers and other malted beverages bear
an indication that they contain alcohol. Perhaps the Beer Wholesaling
License Chapter can be amended to provide as an operational restriction
that: "No (beer wholesaling] licensee shall sell or distribute any alcoholic
beverage that is not clearly labeled in such a manner as is reasonably
calculated to put the public on notice that the beverage is an alcoholic
beverage. The beverage shall bear the label alcoholic beverage' or it shall

bear a label containing the words "beer' or malt liquor' which in common
usage apprises the general public that the beverage contains alcohol." See
S32A-10-6 IttahQadfiAflli. (1983).
It should be noted that the Qtizens' Council is not recommending that
labeling of alcohol content be required. Federal statutes provide that malt
beverage labeling and advertising shall not contain any statement
concerning the alcohol content of the product unless required by state lav.
§££ Sections 3(e) and 3(f) of the Federal Alcohol Admnistration Act, 27 U5.C
SS 205(e) and (f). Although the state can require labeling of alcohol content,
the Qtizens' Council heard testimony to the effect that labeling of alcohol
content on malt beverage should be avoided, since the effects of
differentiating the products by alcohol content may have a deleterious
impact on the public interest if some consumers choose.to consume the
beverage with the higher alcohol content.
H THE CITIZENS-COUNCIL OPPOSES AN AMENDMENT TO PROHIBIT
POLITICAL NOMINATING CONVENTIONS FROM BEING GRANTED A
SINGLE EVENT PEKMIT
A proposal to amend the Single Event Permit Chapter of the Act to
prohibit political parties from being granted a single event permit was also
referred to the Qtizens' Council However, no one addressed the Council
either in favor or in opposition to this proposed amendment.
The Qtizens* Council is not in favor of this proposed amendment The
consensus of the Council is that the Single Event Permit Chapter contains
adequate safeguards and restrictions on the issuance of the single event
permit. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission has plenary power to
grant or deny single event permits. S32A-7-K4) Utah Cede. Ana.. (1985).
The Commission must consider the times, dates, location and purpose of the
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event, and shall determine where the liquor may he stored, sold and
consumed at the event SS 32A-7-3(2)(c) and 32A-7-6(2)(e).(f). and (g) illaH
code Ann. (1985). The Commission may consider other factors or
circumstances it considers necessary to determine whether the permit
should be granted. Rather than amending the Act to deal with specific
organizations and events which, although meeting the facial requirements,
should not be eligible for a permit the Legislature should allow the
Commission to utilize its comprehensive criteria and to exercise its discretion
in determining whether a single event permit should be granted.
Furthermore, it was felt that responsible organizers of political
nominating conventions would, in the exercise of common sense, self-police
their own conventions and would limit the times that liquor was dispensed
to when actual voting was not occurring, based on the realization that the
voting process and alcohol consumption don't mix.

III. CONCLUSION
The Citizens' Council recognises that these recommendations vill not
please everyone. In the realm of alcoholic beverage regulation, controversy
has repeatedly and consistently reared its head. Whatever
recommendations are made, there are always those who say they go too far
and those who say they don't go far enough. Our approach has been
cautious. We have avoided a rush to judgment on issues which we believe
deserve more consideration and which merit further public hearings in order
to more fully elicit and ascertain public opinion. Furthermore, the 1985
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act has only been in effect since July 1985. The
Citizens' Council recognizes that the Legislature may determine that major
substantive changes in the Act should be examined only after there has been
an opportunity to evaluate the performance and gauge the strengths and
deficiencies in the 1985 Act
Issues will continue to resurface. Further amendments to the law
will most certainly be made over time. The Citizens' Council's task is ongoing and it will attempt to provide a forum for the fair consideration of all
issues that may arise involving alcoholic beverages and laws related to their
sale, purchase and consumption.
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Submitted this S O . day of November, 1985.
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ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL
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